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ARTICLES
IMPROBABLE CAUSE: THE COURT'S
PURPOSEFUL EVASION OF A
TRADITIONAL FOURTH AMENDMENT
PROTECTION IN WYOMING V.
HOUGHTON
George M. Dery II
INTRODUCTION
If a person admitted to you that she had stolen your lawnmower,
would you go looking for it in the thief s upstairs bedroom or in her
garage?1 If a motorist confessed to transporting undocumented aliens,
would it be reasonable to search in a suitcase found in the driver's
van? 2 Before you reject the bedroom and suitcase options, consult the
current Supreme Court. A majority of the Justices have been able to
justify an intrusive search despite the lack of probable cause histori-
cally required for such a government intrusion.3 This gap between
justification and invasion occurred in Wyoming v. Houghton.4
t Associate Professor of Criminal Justice, California State University-Fullerton; former
Deputy District Attorney, Los Angeles, California.
' See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1981) (holding that when police officers
have probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of an area, any part of that area is search-
able as long as there is probable cause that the object of the search could be concealed therein).
2 See id.
See Wyoming v. Houghton, 119 S. Ct. 1297 (1999); see also Brief for Respondent at 1,
Wyoming v. Houghton (No. 98-184) [hereinafter Respondent's Brief]: During the suppression
hearing, "the officer admitted that he had no probable cause to search Ms. Houghton and that
men do not usually carry purses." The requirement of probable cause to search is housed in the
Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Wants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
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In Houghton, the Court held that "police officers with probable
cause to search a car may inspect passengers' belongings found in the
car that are capable of concealing the object of the search. 5 Thus, so
long as there exists probable cause to search the car, police have the
right to search all sufficiently large containers, even if they possess
information undermining probable cause to search a particular con-
tainer. This holding releases the automobile exception from its core
requirement: probable cause. In this respect, Houghton dramatically
expands the reach of police search powers under the automobile ex-
ception. Moreover, Houghton's holdingwas reached by both a curi-
ously selective view of history and a novel use of special needs bal-
ancing.6 Therefore, not only the Court's ruling, but its underlying ra-
tionale call decades of precedent into question.
This Article begins, in Part I, with a review of the history of both
the automobile exception and closed container search law. Part II pre-
sents Houghton; its factual background, lower court rulings, and the
Supreme Court's decision. Finally, Part I critically examines
Houghton's analytical flaws and the potential dangers caused by the
Court's extension of the automobile exception.
I. THE CREATION AND EVOLUTION OF THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION
AS PART OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT REASONABLENESS INQUIRY
A. Vehicle Searches
In Houghton, the Supreme Court focused on the scope of Fourth
Amendment rights through the lens of one simple fact: that the search
in question occurred in a car. Justice Scalia, the author of the Court's
opinion, began what he called his "historical evidence" inquiry into
the validity of the search of Houghton's purse by citing the case that
created the automobile exception, Carroll v. United States.7 Thereaf-
ter, he selected tailored passages from Carroll's automobile exception
progeny that were sufficiently ambiguous to avoid conflict with his
newly crafted rule defining the scope of the automobile exception.8
Even during the later balancing analysis in the Court's opinion, Jus-
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
4 119 S. Ct. 1297 (1999).
5 Id. at 1304.
6 See id. at 1301 (stating "neither Ross itself nor the historical evidence it relied upon
admits of a distinction among packages or containers based on ownership").
7 Id. at 1300; Carroll v..United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
8 Houghton, 119 S. Ct at 1300-01 (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982);
United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478 (1985); and Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547
(1978) to support the holding that a police officer may conduct a warrantless search of a passen-
gers purse).
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tice Scalia failed to get out of the car to look at the bigger picture. In
weighing Houghton's privacy interests, Justice Scalia equated her
mere "presence in the car" with the increased likelihood that she was
"in league" with the driver.9 Similarly, precedent promoting individ-
ual privacy against the government's assumption of guilt by associa-
tion was dismissed as involving "traumatic consequences" that simply
"are not to be expected" by searches of a car.10
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's contrary attempt in Wyo-
ming v. Houghton, the automobile exception can neither be fully un-
derstood nor properly applied in a vacuum. By its very name, the
automobile exception speaks to a larger rule. Searches are valid under
the Fourth Amendment not because they take place in or out of an
automobile, but because they are "reasonable;" the Fourth Amend-
ment prohibits only searches that are unreasonable."
Thus, to survive Fourth Amendment scrutiny, a search, including
a search of a vehicle, must be "reasonable." This inquiry leads to yet
another question: what is meant by reasonableness? The answer lies
in the Fourth Amendment's structure. The Amendment has two
clauses: (1) a Reasonableness Clause; and (2) a Warrant Clause. The
Reasonableness Clause provides: "The right of the people to be se-
cure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreason-
able searches and seizures, shall not be violated."' 2 The Warrant
Clause reads: "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."' 3 The relation-
ship between these two clauses is open to dispute, because they are
connected by the ambiguous word, "and.',
14
However, for most of this century, the Court has opted to resolve
the ambiguity by defining the reasonableness of government activity
by how closely it comports with the restrictions laid out in the War-
rant Clause.15 The Warrant Clause's central role in defining reason-
ableness was perhaps best expressed over a half-century ago by Jus-
tice Felix Frankfurter. Justice Frankfurter explained:
9 See id. at 1303.
'0 See id. at 1302.
1 See generally U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 See id.
15 See Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 32 (1925) (holding that the warrantless
search of a dwelling is abhorrent to the laws of the United States and therefore, per se unreason-
able).
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[S]earches are "unreasonable" unless authorized by a warrant
and a warrant hedged about by adequate safeguards. "Unrea-
sonable" is not to be determined with reference to a particular
search and seizure considered in isolation. The "reason" by
which search and seizure is to be tested is the "reason" that
was written out of historic experience into the Fourth
Amendment. This means that, with minor and severely con-
fined exceptions, inferentially a part of the Amendment,
every search and seizure is unreasonable when made without
a magistrate's authority expressed through a validly issued
warrant.
16
The Justices who joined the majority opinion in Carroll, the
seminal case establishing the automobile exception, were keenly
aware of the traditional preference for warrants. 17 Chief Justice Taft,
who authored Carroll, devoted nearly seventeen of the opinion's
twenty pages to justifying the Court's dispensing with a warrant re-
quirement in only certain narrow circumstances involving searches of
automobiles.'s
In Carroll, defendants George Carroll and John Kiro were con-
victed of transporting in an automobile 68 quarts of whiskey and gin
"in violation of the National Prohibition Act,"'19 passed by Congress
to enforce the Eighteenth Amendment. 20 This case began with an un-
successful undercover buy by federal prohibition agents Cronenwett
and Scully.2 1 Although Carroll and Kiro, along with another bootleg-
ger, had agreed to sell the officers whiskey at $130 a case, they ulti-
mately failed to close the deal.22
About one week later, officer Cronenwett was on his regular pa-
trol of the road from Detroit, "one of the most active centers for in-
troducing illegally into this country spirituous liquors for distribution
into the interior," to Grand Rapids-the city of the previous unsuc-
16 Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 161-162 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
17 See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
'8 See id. at 143-59 (requiring probable cause if a police officer is to search a vehicle
without a warrant).
19 Id. at 134.
20 The Eighteenth Amendment provides in part:
Section 1. After one year from the ratification of this article the manufacture, sale,
or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the
exportation thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdic-
tion thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited.
Section 2. The Congress and the several states shall have concurrent power to en-
force this article by appropriate legislation.
U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII.
21 See Carroll, 267 U.S. at 134-35.
22 See id.
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cessful undercover buy.23 At this time, Cronenwett saw "the Carroll
boys" driving down the road in the same Oldsmobile Roadster that
the defendants had driven when they had agreed to sell whiskey to
Cronenwett and Scully. 24 Some two months after, the agents, while on
their prohibition patrol, again spotted Carroll's Roadster driving on
the same road going from the source city of Detroit to Grand Rap-
ids.2 They stopped and searched the car, finding that the seat's up-
holstery had been replaced with 68 bottles of whiskey and gin.26
Police arrested Carroll and Kiro, seized the liquor, and im-
pounded the Roadster.27 Before trial, Carroll unsuccessfully moved to
suppress the evidence gathered as a result of the search of his
Oldsmobile.28 His conviction thus ultimately presented a Fourth
Amendment issue to the Court.29
Chief Justice Taft began his analysis in Carroll with a full review
not only of the National Prohibition Act itself, but also with an in-
depth discussion of its legislative history.30 For example, the Chief
Justice noted that the conference report from the two houses of Con-
gress provided for punishment of officers for warrantless searches of
"private dwelling(s)," while punishment for warrantless searches of
other forms of "property" was justified only when done "maliciously
and without probable cause.' 31 Chief Justice Taft interpreted such
distinctions as congressional intent to establish a boundary for the
warrant requirement between houses and cars.32 The Carroll Court
then concluded that Congress' distinction for warrant purposes be-
tween homes and vehicles was consistent with the Fourth Amend-
ment.3 3 Carroll's concern with abiding by the Warrant Clause's man-
date was also evidenced in its review of earlier Congressional enact-
ments:
23 See id. at 134, 160.24 See id. at 135.
2 See id. at 135-36.
26 See id. at 136.
27 See id.
2 Consistent with the interpretation of search and seizure rights at the time, Carroll actu-
ally moved for a return to him of the liquor seized. See id. at 134.
2' See id. at 143.
'0 See id. at 143-47.
31 Id. at 146.
32 The Chief Justice opined:
The intent of Congress to make a distinction between the necessity for a search
warrant in the searching of private dwellings and in that of automobiles and other
road vehicles is [sic] the enforcement of the Prohibition Act is thus clearly estab-
lished by the legislative history of the Stanley amendment.
Id. at 147.
33 See id. ("The Fourth Amendment does not denounce all searches or seizures, but only
such as are reasonable.").
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Thus contemporaneously with the adoption of the Fourth
Amendment we find in the first Congress, and in the follow-
ing Second and Fourth Congresses, a difference made as to
the necessity for a search warrant between goods subject to
forfeiture, when concealed in a dwelling house or similar
place, and like goods in course of transportation and con-
cealed in a movable vessel where they readily could be put
out of reach of a search warrant. 34
Thus, at this early stage in automobile exception jurisprudence, the
Court had not yet considered the ultimate scope of the police search
power in automobile exception cases. It instead concentrated on the
issue at bar-whether any such search could be lawfully executed
without a search warrant.
The narrowness of the Court's focus on warrant compliance was
demonstrated by the Court's own conclusion after its review of
precedent: "In none of the cases cited is there any ruling as to the va-
lidity under the Fourth Amendment of a seizure without a warrant of
contraband goods in the course of transportation and subject to for-
feiture or destruction."35 Likewise, the Court's tilt toward the Warrant
Clause was referred to in the statement of its rule:
On reason and authority the true rule is that if the search and
seizure without a warrant are made upon probable cause, that
is, upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances
known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other ve-
hicle contains that which by law is subject to seizure and de-
struction, the search and seizure are valid.36
When the Carroll Court turned to the issue of probable cause, it
demonstrated the same patience and caution it employed when de-
ciding whether automobile searches fell within the Court's warrant
preference. Chief Justice Taft began Carroll's probable cause assess-
ment with a detailed consideration of the geography of Officers
, , 37
Cronnenwett's and Scully's stop of Carroll and Kiro. Carroll noted
34 Id. at 15 1.
35 Id. at 149.
36 id.
37 The Carroll Court relied upon The Apollon as authority for considering the place of
search as relevant to the formation of probable cause:
Finally, was there probable cause? In The Apollon, the question was whether the sei-
zure of a French vessel at a particular place was upon probable cause that she was
there for the purpose of smuggling. In this discussion Mr. Justice Story, who deliv-
ered the judgment of the Court, said:
[The Court is bound to take notice of public facts and geographical po-
sitions; and... this remote part of the country has been infested, at dif-
[Vol. 50:547
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that "Detroit and its neighborhood along the Detroit River" were lo-
cated at "the International Boundary,'? which was "one of the most
active centers for introducing illegally into this country spirituous
liquors for distribution into the interior."38 Grand Rapids, the site of
the aborted undercover buy, was "about 152 miles from Detroit."39
The attempted purchase of liquor from Carroll and Kiro provided of-
ficers with reason to believe that "the Carroll Boys" were "bootleg-
gers" who sold their illegal beverages in Grand Rapids.40 Just over a
week after their liquor purchase negotiations with the defendants, the
prohibition agents, who regularly patrolled the "important highways"
from Detroit to Grand Rapids, saw and attempted to follow the
Carroll Boys on these roads. 41 Two months later, the officers ob-
served the defendants on the same route, this time presumably coming
from Detroit.42 Still more facts went to support probable cause: "The
partners in the original combination to sell liquor in Grand Rapids
were together in the same automobile they had been in the night when
they tried to furnish the whiskey to the officers which was thus identi-
fied as part of the firm equipment."4 3 Chief Justice Taft was even alert
to the direction of Carroll's vehicle, for he noted that Carroll and
Kiro were "coming from the direction of the great source of supply
for their stock to Grand Rapids where they plied their trade.'" This
analysis of the totality of the circumstances enabled the Carroll Court
to conclude: "the facts and circumstances within [the officers']
knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information
were sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution
in the belief that intoxicating liquor was being transported in the
automobile which they stopped and searched." 45
When the Court returned to the automobile exception six years
later in Husty v. United States,46 it retained Carroll's narrow state-
ment of police search authority as well as a full commitment to as-
sessing probable cause in the individual case. Justice Stone, who
authored the Court's opinion, limited Carroll's holding to its bootleg-
ging circumstances in stating that "[t]he Fourth Amendment does not
ferent periods, by smugglers, is a matter of general notoriety, and may be
gathered from the public documents of the government.
Id. at 159-60 (quoting The Apollon, 22 U.S. 362, 375 (9 Wheat.) (1824)).
" Id. at 160.
D Id.
40 See id.
41 See id.
S2 See id.
43 Id.
44 id.
41 Id. at 162.
4' 282 U.S. 694 (1931).
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prohibit the search, without warrant, of an automobile, for liquor ille-
gally transported or possessed, if the search is upon probable cause.
' 47
Further, the Court's discussion of the case's exigencies in upholding
the propriety of the search in the individual case demonstrated that the
Court had yet to consider the automobile exception as a valid warrant
exception in every automobile search. Accordingly, Justice Stone ra-
tionalized the failure of these officers to obtain a warrant as follows:
The search was not unreasonable because, as petitioners ar-
gue, sufficient time elapsed between the receipt by the officer
of the information and the search of the car to have enabled
him to procure a search warrant. He could not know when
Husty would come to the car or how soon it would be re-
moved. In such circumstances, we do not think the officers
should be required to speculate upon the chances of success-
fully carrying out the search, after the delay and withdrawal
from the scene.., which would have been necessary to pro-
cure a warrant.
48
Here, Husty explicitly stated that the Court considered the propriety
of obtaining a warrant based on the circumstances present in the indi-
vidual case. Such a focus on case-specific facts demonstrated that the
Court had not yet reached the point where it felt comfortable dis-
pensing with a warrant requirement in every search of an automobile
based merely upon its mobile nature.
Husty showed the same kind of analytical restraint in its weigh-
ing of the officers' probable cause. Like Carroll, Husty involved fed-
eral prohibition agents searching a car of a known "bootlegger., 49 In
fact, one of the officers executing the current search had twice previ-
ously arrested Husty.50 Each of these arrests resulted in convictions
under the National Prohibition Act.51 On the day of arrest, one of the
agents had received a telephone tip that "Husty had two loads of liq-
uor in automobiles of a particular make and description, parked in
particular places on named streets. 52 The officer knew this telephone
informant well for he had previously supplied the agent with "similar
information [that] had always been found to be reliable. '53 Much of
the tip's information was corroborated when agents found one of the
described cars at the indicated place and "in the control of Husty," a
47 Id. at 700.
48 Id. at 701.
49 See id. at 700.
50 See id.
51 See id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
['Vol. 50:547
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known bootlegger.54 Moreover, the probable cause of the officers was
further strengthened by "the prompt attempt of [Husty's] two com-
panions to escape when hailed by the officers. 55 Thus, as in Carroll,
the Husty Court based its probable cause determination on all of the
facts surrounding the case, rather than a single circumstance or fac-
tor.56
Over twenty years after creating the automobile exception, the
Court not only maintained, but indeed deepened its probable cause
analysis. In Brinegar v. United States,57 the Court faced yet another
search of a car for illegally transported liquor.58 In Brinegar, Justice
Rutledge, writing for the majority noted that "the basic facts held to
constitute probable cause in the Carroll case were very similar to the
basic facts here."59 Brinegar summarized these "ultimate facts" as
follows:
In each case the search was of an automobile moving on a
public highway and was made without a warrant by federal
officers charged with enforcing federal statutes outlawing the
transportation of intoxicating liquors .... In each instance
the officers were patrolling the highway in the discharge of
their duty. And in each before stopping the car or starting to
pursue it they recognized both the driver and the car, from
recent personal contact and observation, as having been lately
' See id. at 700-01.
5' Id.at 701.
56 Husty's detailed analysis was not exceptional. Seven years later in Scher v. United
States, when it was again called upon to weigh probable cause in support of the automobile
exception, the Court articulated a wealth of particulars:
Federal officers received confidential information thought to be reliable that about
midnight, December 30, 1935, a Dodge automobile with specified license plate
would transport "phony" whiskey from a specified dwelling in Cleveland, Ohio.
About nine-thirty, officers posted nearby saw the described automobile stop in front
of the house and remain there for an hour. A man with three women and a package,
then entered the car and drove away. It returned shortly before midnight, stopped at
the rear of the house and remained for half an hour. The headlights were extin-
guished; the officers heard what seemed to be heavy paper packages passing over
wood. Doors slammed; petitioner drove the car away, apparently heavily loaded.
The officers followed in another car. After going a few blocks petitioner stopped
briefly at a filling station; then he drove towards his own residence two or three
blocks further along. The officers followed. He turned into a garage a few feet back
of his residence and within the curtilage.
305 U.S. 251,253 (1938).
Acting upon these facts, officers approached and searched the car without a warrant,
finding "eighty-eight bottles of distilled spirits in unstamped containers" in violation of the
federal Liquor Taxing Act of 1934. Id. at 251, 253-54. As in Carroll and Husty, the Court in
Scher weighed the totality of the circumstances in reaching a decision upholding probable
cause. Id. at 254-55 (stating "the officers did nothing either unreasonable or oppressive").
5 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
5 See id. at 161-162.
'9 Id. at 165.
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engaged in illicit liquor dealings. Finally, each driver was
proceeding in his identified car in a direction from a known
source of liquor supply toward a probable illegal market, un-
der circumstances indicating no other probable purpose than
to carry on his illegal adventure.60
However, the Brinegar Court was not content to base its probable
cause determination merely on the broad similarities between the two
searches. Instead, Justice Rutledge delved into a second layer of
analysis where he weighed the "subordinate facts" to determine if
differences in any details caused the outcomes of the two cases to dif-
fer.61 For instance, Brinegar compared the significance of the geo-
graphical settings in each case. While Carroll took judicial notice of
Detroit's role as an "active center" for entry of illicit liquor from
Canada, Brinegar relied upon "[Officer] Malsed's personal knowl-
edge derived from direct observation" that Joplin, Missouri was the
defendant's liquor source.62 Likewise, Justice Rutledge dissected the
details regarding the differences in destination or the defendant's
"probable place of market," in Brinegar and Carroll.63 Carroll in-
volved the illegal transportation of alcohol from Canada into the then-
dry United States, where Brinegar dealt with illegal importation from
Missouri, a "wet state," into Oklahoma, a "dry state." 64 After seri-
ously considering all the particulars, the Court in Brinegar concluded:
Notwithstanding the variations in detail . . . we think the
proof in this case furnishes support quite as strong as that
made in the Carroll case, indeed stronger in some respects, to
sustain the ultimate facts there held in the aggregate to con-
stitute probable cause for a search identical in all substantial
and material respects with the one made here.
65
Brinegar's serious efforts to assess probable cause demonstrated
the importance the Court attached to this Fourth Amendment re-
quirement. A person who has given officers substantial grounds for
probable cause is not immune from police seizure and search.66 In
contrast, "the citizen who has given no good cause for believing he is
engaged in [transportation of contraband] is entitled to proceed on his
60 Id. at 165-66 (footnotes omitted).
61 See id. at 166.
62 See id. at 167-68.
63 See id. at 168.
64 Id. at 168-69.
6 Id. at 170.
66 See id. at 176-77.
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way without interference." 67 At this juncture, the Court offered still
another word of caution:
This does not mean, as seems to be assumed, that every trav-
eler along the public highways may be stopped and searched
at the officers' whim, caprice or mere suspicion. The ques-
tion presented in the Carroll case lay on the border between
suspicion and probable cause. But the Court carefully consid-
ered that problem and resolved it by concluding that the facts
within the officers' knowledge when they intercepted the
Carroll defendants amounted to more than mere suspicion
and constituted probable cause for their action.
68
The Court maintained its reverence for the Warrant Clause and its
strict adherence to the probable cause standard into and throughout
the 1960s. Granted, the Court in Preston v. United States69 conceded:
"Common sense dictates, of course, that questions involving searches
of motorcars or other things readily moved cannot be treated as iden-
tical to questions arising out of searches of fixed structures like
houses."70 Despite this minimal departure from precedent, however,
Pretson still defined Fourth Amendment reasonableness with respect
to the Court's preference for warrants:
[E]ven in the case of motorcars, the test still is, was the
search unreasonable. Therefore we must inquire whether the
facts of this case are such as to fall within any of the excep-
tions to the constitutional rule that a search warrant must be
had before a search may be made.
71
Preston found no magical force in the automobile exception itself.
Although the case involved the arrest of three men while they were
"seated in a motorcar 72 for a crime they were then committing in the
car (vagrancy), the automobile exception did not save the unlawful
search of the glove compartment and trunk.7 Indeed, in a later case,
Cooper v. California,74 the Court viewed Preston as primarily a case
67 Id. at 177.
(s Id. (footnote omitted).
69 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
'0 Id. at 366.
7' Id. at 367.
72 See id. at 365.
73 See id. at 368 ("We think that the search was too remote in time or place to have been
made as incidental to the arrest and conclude, therefore, that the search of the car without a
warrant failed to meet the test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment ... .
74 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
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involving an invalid search incident to arrest.75 Further, in Cooper,
the Court took another opportunity to hammer away at the "totality of
the circumstances" notion that reasonableness "depends upon the
facts and circumstances of each case.,
76
Near the close of the decade, the Court decided another automo-
bile exception case, Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., Inc.77 In
Dyke, Justice White, who delivered the Court's opinion, reiterated
that the automobile exception cases "have... always insisted that the
officers conducting the search have 'reasonable or probable cause' to
believe that they will find the instrumentality of a crime or evidence
pertaining to a crime before they begin their warrantless search." 78 In
Dyke, victims to a shooting testified in court that they "recognized the
car from which shots were fired as a two-tone 1960 or 1961 Dodge"
and that one of the victims had returned fire, hitting the Dodge in the
trunk.79 Further evidence indicated that the car police searched was a
1960 Dodge "with a fresh bullet hole through the trunk lid" and with
an air rifle under the seat.80 Despite all of the facts connecting the de-
fendant's car to the shooting, Justice White found probable cause to
search lacking in the case.81 This was because no officer performing
the search had any knowledge of the details supporting probable
cause; no one had communicated these particulars to the officers at
the time they actually searched the car. 82 Sheriff Powers' testimony
was illustrative of this point. He related: "All I got is just that it would
be an old make model car. Kinda old make model car., 83 Thus, as late
as 1968, the Court showed no hesitation in invalidating a search
where the officers failed to gather sufficient information to give rise
to probable cause, justifying their search of an automobile.
In 1970 the Court firmly established the probable cause require-
ment for its automobile exception. In Chambers v. Maroney,84 Justice
White, writing for the majority, took care to fully discuss the wealth
of detailed facts in support of probable cause.85 The Court in Cham-
bers provided details that two men robbed, at gunpoint, a service sta-
75 See id. at 59 ("In Preston the search was sought to be justified primarily on the ground
that it was incidental and part of a lawful arrest.").
76 id.
77 391 U.S. 216 (1968).
7s See id. at 221.
79 Id. at 219.80 See id.
s See id. at 221-22.
82 See id. ("The record before us does not contain evidence that [any searching officer]
had reasonable or probable cause to believe that evidence would be found in petitioners' car.").
83 Id. at 222.
'4 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
85 See id. at 44-45,52 (1970).
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tion attendant of currency and coins.86 Further, a blue compact station
wagon, circling the block around the gas station and then later
speeding away around the time of the robbery, was seen to be holding
four men, one of whom was wearing a green sweater.8 7 The service
station employee told police that one robber wore a green sweater
while the other wore a trench coat.8 8 Within an hour, police stopped
four men in a light blue compact station wagon answering the radio
broadcast description of the getaway car.89 The defendant, who was in
the stopped car, was wearing a green sweater. Moreover, there was a
trench coat in the car.90 These facts led Justice White to conclude:
[Tihe police had probable cause to believe that the robbers,
carrying guns and the fruits of the crime, had fled the scene
in a light blue compact station wagon which would be carry-
ing four men, one wearing a green sweater and another
wearing a trench coat.... [Tihere was probable cause to ar-
rest the occupants of the station wagon that the officers
stopped; just as obviously was there probable cause to search
the car for guns and stolen money.
91
Not only did Chambers fully consider the circumstances sup-
porting probable cause, it also reinforced the Court's allegiance to the
Warrant Clause.92 Notably, over four decades after the creation of the
automobile exception, the Court still demonstrated its wariness of
relying solely upon an officer's judgment in forming probable cause.
In Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, probable cause was only a
"minimum requirement," for the "general rule" also necessitated "the
judgment of a magistrate on the probable-cause issue and the issuance
of a warrant before a search is made." 93 Further, the exigent circum-
stances, which can excuse a lack of a warrant, will not always flow
from the mere existence of a car. Justice White so indicated by stating
that "[n]either Carrol ... nor other cases in this Court require or sug-
gest that in every conceivable circumstance the search of an auto even
with probable cause may be made without the extra protection for
privacy that a warrant affords. 94
86 See id. at 44.
8' See id.
"s See id.
8' See id.
90 See id.
" Id. at47-48.
92 See id. at 50-52 ("As a general rule, [the Fourth Amendment] has ... required the
judgment of a magistrate on the probable-cause issue and the issuance of a warrant before a
search is made.").
9- Id. at 51.
94 Id at 50.
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Yet, the most striking development in Chambers was its change
in focus. Justice White moved beyond the Court's firmly rooted prob-
able cause analysis to consider the automobile exception's scope. The
temporal and spatial boundaries.of the automobile exception became
an issue because of the officer's particular actions in the case. At the
scene of the stop, even though armed with probable cause to both ar-
rest and search, the officers chose only to arrest the occupants, and
merely drove the car to the station.95 Therefore, the search of the car
did not occur immediately on the street, but later at the station, after
the occupants were safely in custody.96 The search recovered two .38
caliber revolvers (one of which was loaded with dumdum bullets),97
along with change from the gas station robbery and still other evi-
dence linking the car's occupants to yet another robbery.
98
Chambers ultimately upheld the search by expanding the scope
of the automobile exception. Justice White accomplished this expan-
sion by the creation of a rough-and dubious-equation. Chambers
began its scope analysis by recognizing that a seizure alone is less
intrusive than a seizure and accompanying search.99 In this vein, Jus-
tice White acknowledged: "Arguably, because of the preference for a
magistrate's judgment, only immobilization of the car should be per-
mitted until a search warrant is obtained; arguably, only the 'lesser'
intrusion is permissible until the magistrate authorizes the
'greater. ' ' l° Yet, in the very next sentence, Justice White contra-
dicted himself, stating that determining "which is the 'greater' and
which is 'lesser' intrusion is itself a debatable question and the an-
swer may depend on a variety of circumstances."1 °1 The Court failed
to indicate, however, what circumstances would make a seizure and
search less an intrusion than a simple seizure. It would seem that
common sense points to a seizure without intrusion into privacy as the
lesser government invasion. Further, if a motorist wished to forgo the
wait for a search warrant, he or she could simply consent to a search.
Chambers, however, was oblivious to any such distinction. Jus-
tice White opined:
For constitutional purposes, we see no difference between on
the one hand seizing and holding a car before presenting the
probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand
95 See id. at 44.
96 See id.
97 A dumdum bullet is a type of armor-piercing bullet.
98 See id.
99 See id. at51-52.
10 Id.
101 Id. at 51-52.
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carrying out an immediate search without a warrant. Given
probable cause to search, either course is reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment.1
02
Chambers thus allowed police to perform an automobile exception
search not only on the street, but at the station house.10
3
In advancing such an argument, Justice White appeared curi-
ously forgetful of Chambers' own emphasis on the importance of the
magistrate's role in weighing probable cause. The very assumption
that an officer's probable cause determination is sufficient, even ab-
sent the exigency that exists during a vehicle stop on the road, could
undermine the rationale for a warrant requirement itself. If an officer
need not obtain a warrant when an arrestee is securely in custody and
his or her car is safely immobilized, why require prior judicial ap-
proval in any event? Thus, in its first attempt at explicitly defining the
scope of the automobile exception, the Court cast a shadow over the
fundamental Fourth Amendment protection of the warrant preference.
The extension of the automobile exception search necessitated
the Court to reassess, and likewise expand, the rationale underlying
this exception to the warrant requirement. As part of this effort, the
Court identified another distinction between vehicles and fixed
structures. In Cady v. Dombrowski,1°4 the Court noted that vehicles
and traffic fell under "extensive regulation," mandating that drivers
be licensed and their vehicles be registered, maintained in a proper
condition, and operated in a safe manner.1°5 Due to breakdowns and
accidents, cars caused "substantially greater ... police-citizen con-
tact" than did homes or offices. 106 Although some of these interac-
tions involved the enforcement of criminal laws, frequently officers
merely performed "community caretaking functions" with no eye to
pursuing a criminal investigation. 10
7
These multiple contacts with the community enabled the Cady
Court to note:
Although the original justification advanced for treating
automobiles differently from houses, insofar as warrantless
searches of automobiles by federal officers was concerned,
was the vagrant and mobile nature of the former, warrantless
'02 id. at 52.
103 See id. ("Tihe blue station wagon could have been searched on the spot when it was
stopped since there was probable cause to search and it was a fleeting target for search. The
probable-cause factor still obtained at the station house and so did the mobility of the car. .
"4 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
"" See id. at 441.
w6 See id.
107 See id.
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searches of vehicles by state officers have been sustained in
cases in which the possibilities of the vehicle's being re-
moved or evidence in it destroyed were remote, if not non-
existent. The constitutional difference between searches of
and seizures from houses and similar structures and from ve-
hicles stems both from the ambulatory character of the latter
and from the fact that extensive, and often noncriminal con-
tact with automobiles will bring local official in "plain view"
of evidence, fruits, or instrumentalities of a crime, or contra-
band.'18
The Court expanded on its theme that cars, by their public use,
provide less privacy than homes or other effects in Cardwell v.
Lewis.1°9 Justice Blackmun, authoring the Court's opinion in Lewis,
saw the simple purpose of a car as significant: "One has a lesser ex-
pectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is trans-
portation and it seldom serves as one's residence or as the repository
of personal effects."110 Moreover, of particular importance to the fu-
ture Houghton decision, Justice Blackmun indicated a hierarchy of
privacy expectation within a car itself. In downplaying the govern-
ment's intrusion on Arthur Lewis' car as involving only "the exami-
nation of the tire on the wheel and the taking of paint scrapings from
the exterior of the vehicle," Justice Blackmun signaled that other ve-
hicle invasions could impact more deeply on Fourth Amendment in-
terests."1 Specifically, Justice Blackmun noted: "In the present case,
nothing from the interior of the car and no personal effects, which the
Fourth Amendment traditionally has been deemed to protect, were
searched or seized and introduced in evidence."' 12 Here, the Court
alluded to another issue that created consternation and contradiction
among the justices: searches of containers.
B. Container Searches
If a car may be searched without a warrant due to the exigencies
caused by its mobility, logic would seem to dictate that so may any
movable container.!13 The Court, however, "squarely rejected" such
10 Id. at 441-42 (citations omitted).
'09 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974).
11o Id.
... See id. at 591.
112 Id.
113 The argument likening cars to containers was offered in United States v. Chadwick, 433
U.S. 1, 11-12 (1977). There, the Court characterized the government's contention as follows:
The Government [argues] that the rationale of our automobile search cases demon-
strates the reasonableness of permitting warrantless searches of luggage; the Gov-
ernment views such luggage as analogous to motor vehicles for Fourth Amendment
purposes. It is true that, like the footlocker in issue here, automobiles are "effects"
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an argument in United States v. Chadwick. 14 In Chadwick, Amtrak
railroad officials in San Diego became suspicious when they observed
two men, one of which matched a drug trafficker profile, load a trunk
onto a train bound for Boston." 5 The footlocker was "unusually
heavy" and leaking talcum powder, a substance "often used to mask
the odor of marihuana or hashish."' 16 In Boston, federal narcotics
agents, alerted by their counterparts in San Diego, met the train with a
trained police dog who ultimately signaled the presence of a con-
trolled substance inside the trunk. 117 The defendants loaded the foot-
locker in the trunk of a car, and "while the trunk of the car was still
open and before the car engine had been started," the agents arrested
the defendants and transported the footlocker to the Federal Build-
ing." 8 Ninety minutes later, the agents performed a warrantless search
of the footlocker." 9
The Court in Chadwick, characterizing the footlocker's presence
in an automobile trunk as merely "brief contact" with the car, might
have previously signaled to the litigants a reluctance to consider this
as an automobile exception case. 2 Thus, the government instead de-
fended the search by contending that history indicated the Warrant
Clause protected only "homes, offices, and private communications"
which "lie at the core of the Fourth Amendment."' 121 Chief Justice
Burger, who authored the Court's opinion in Chadwick, deemed it a
"mistake to conclude, as the Government contended, that the Warrant
Clause was . . . intended to guard only against intrusions into the
home." 22 The Chief Justice then reaffirmed the primacy of the War-
rant Clause:
First, the Warrant Clause does not in terms distinguish be-
tween searches conducted in private homes and other
searches. There is also a strong historical connection between
the Warrant Clause and the initial clause of the Fourth
Amendment, which draws no distinctions among "persons,
under the Fourth amendment, and searches and seizures of automobiles are therefore
subject to the constitutional standard of reasonableness.
Id. at 11-12.
'4 433 U.S. 1 (1977) (cited in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 810-11 (1982)).
"5 See Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 3.
116 Id.
"7 See id. at 3-4.
"' See id. at4.
119 See id.
12o See id. at 11.
12 Id. at 7.
122 Id. at 8 (citation omitted).
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houses, papers, and effects" in safeguarding against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures.
123
Thus, the government was left with the fallback argument that
since containers shared the automobile's mobility, they should like-
wise be open to warrantless searches based on probable cause.
124
Chadwick refused to equate cars and containers, emphasizing that "a
person's expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially
greater than in an automobile."' 25 The Court therefore found the
agents' warrantless search of the footlocker unjustified. 126 In so doing,
Chadwick "reaffirmed the general principle that closed packages and
containers may not be searched without a warrant."' 127
The Court extended Chadwick with Arkansas v. Sanders, another
drug trafficking case. 128 In Sanders, Little Rock police learned from a
reliable informant that Sanders would arrive at the municipal airport
in the afternoon on a particular flight, at a specified gate, carrying a
green suitcase containing marijuana.129 Officers at the airport ob-
served details corroborating the informant's tip, including the exis-
tence of a green suitcase.130 Sanders handed the suitcase to a com-
panion, who put it in the trunk of a taxi.131 When Sanders and his
companion rode away in the cab, police pursued, stopped the taxi,
opened the trunk, recovered and opened the suitcase, and found
marijuana. 132
In considering the validity of the search of the green suitcase un-
der the Fourth Amendment, Justice Powell, writing for the Court in
Sanders, emphasized the "prominent place [of] the warrant require-
ment." 33 Powell noted, "normally searches of private property [must]
be performed pursuant to a search warrant issued in compliance with
the Warrant Clause."'
134
Thus, validity turned upon whether the search fell into an excep-
tion to the warrant requirement, namely the automobile exception.
35
123 Id.
124 See id. at 11-12.
'2 Id. at 13.
126 See id. at 15.
127 United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 812 (1982).
128 See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
129 See id. at 755.
130 See id.
131 See id.
132 See id.
133 Id. at 759.
'34 Id. at 758.
13- Justice Powell characterized the government's contention as follows: "The State argues,
nevertheless, that the warrantless search of respondent's suitcase was proper, not because the
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The Court in Sanders seemed alarmed at the effect such an argument
could have on the scope of the automobile exception. Justice Powell
worried: "In effect, the State would have us extend Carroll to allow
warrantless searches of everything found within an automobile, as
well as the vehicle itself."'
136
Sanders saw the search of the suitcase recovered from the trunk
of a car not as an automobile exception case, but as a container case.
The Court adhered to this view despite the fact that Sanders, unlike
Chadwick, involved the stopping of a vehicle after it was already
moving. 137 Justice Powell concluded that, "as a general rule there is
no greater need for warrantless searches of luggage taken from auto-
mobiles than of luggage taken from other places.' 38 Indeed, the
Sanders Court went out of its way to discount the importance of the
automobile's impact in this case. The Sanders opinion concluded:
"Our decision in this case means only that a warrant generally is re-
quired before personal luggage can be searched that and the extent to
which the Fourth Amendment applies to containers and other parcels
depends not at all upon whether they are seized from an automo-
bile." 139
C. Searches of Containers in Vehicles
As established above, Carroll and its progeny gave police-pos-
sessing probable cause-the authority to search automobiles without
a warrant. Chadwick and Sanders, however, prohibited those same
officers from searching containers without prior judicial approval,
even if the containers were ultimately placed in cars. The Court's dis-
tinction between automobiles and containers thus created two lines of
conflicting precedent which ultimately collided in United States v.
Ross.1
40
In Ross, a reliable informant told Detective Marcum that a per-
son known as "Bandit" was selling narcotics out of the trunk of a
"purplish maroon" Chevrolet Malibu parked at 439 Ridge Street.141
The informant had also stated that "he had just observed 'Bandit'
complete a sale and that 'Bandit' had told him that additional narcot-
property searched was luggage, but rather because it was taken from an automobile lawfully
stopped and searched on the street." Id. at 762.
" Id.
1-1 See id. at 755; see also California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 571 (1990) (noting that
"[iln Arkansas v. Sanders... the Court extended Chadwick's rule to apply to a suitcase actually
being transported in the trunk of a car").
, Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 713,763-64 (1979).
'I ld.at764-65n.13.
'4' 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
141 Seeid. at Ron_
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ics were in the trunk.'142 Police responded to 439 Ridge Street, find-
ing an unoccupied car matching the description provided by the in-
formant. 143 When the officers ran the car's plates, they learned it was
registered to an "Albert Ross" who used the alias "Bandit." 144 Seeing
no one in the car, police left the scene to return five minutes later.
145
At this time, officers saw the Malibu being driven by a person
matching the suspect's description. 146 Officers stopped and arrested
Ross. 47 During a search of the car's trunk at the scene, police found a
closed brown paper bag. 148 One of the officers at the arrest, Detective
Cassidy, opened the bag and found "glassine bags containing a white
powder" later determined to be heroin. 49 At a more thorough search
at the station, Detective Cassidy found in the trunk a "zippered red
leather pouch" containing $3,200 in cash. 150 None of the searches
were supported by a warrant.
151
With the recovery and search of containers found in Bandit's
Malibu, Ross directly presented the Court with an issue regarding the
scope of the automobile exception. Justice Stevens, writing for the
Court in Ross, phrased the question as follows:
In this case, we consider the extent to which police officers-
who have legitimately stopped an automobile and who have
probable cause to believe that contraband is concealed
somewhere within it-may conduct a probing search of com-
partments and containers within the vehicle whose contents
are not in plain view.
152
Justice Stevens began Ross's analysis by returning to the auto-
mobile exception's origin; Carroll. Thig in-depth approach prevented
the Court from missing Carroll's emphasis on "the importance of the
requirement that officers have probable cause to believe the vehicle
contains contraband.' ' 153 Ross cautioned that probable cause had to be
"based on objective facts that could justify the issuance of a warrant
142 Id.
143 See id.
'4 See id.
'4' See id. at 800-01.
'46 See id. at 801.
147 See id.
148 See id.
10 See id.
'- See id.
151 See id.
"' Id. at 800.
1-3 Id. at 807-08.
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by a magistrate and not merely on the subjective good faith of the
police officers." 154
Indeed, probable cause was so important that it not only formed
the justification for a search under the automobile exception, it also
defined the boundaries of that search. Justice Stevens explained:
The scope of a warrantless search of an automobile... is not
defined by the nature of the container in which the contra-
band is secreted. Rather, it is defined by the object of the
search and the places in which there is probable cause to be-
lieve it may be found. Just as probable cause to believe a
stolen lawnmower may be found in a garage will not support
a warrant to search an upstairs bedroom, probable cause to
believe that undocumented aliens are being transported in a
van will not justify a warrantless search of a suitcase. Prob-
able cause to believe that a container placed in the trunk of a
taxi contains contraband or evidence does not justify a search
of the entire cab.1
55
Thus, Ross assessed probable cause in the automobile exception
context exactly as it would in a search based on a warrant. Justice
Stevens therefore noted that "[t]he scope of a warrantless search
based on probable cause is no narrower-and no broader-than the
scope of a search authorized by a warrant supported by probable
cause. Only the prior approval of the magistrate is waived; the search
otherwise is as the magistrate could authorize."'156
The automobile exception under Ross thus became a return to the
basics. When the parties quarreled over whether the automobile ex-
ception extended to containers, they were asking the wrong question.
Instead, the inquiry should have been where in the vehicle was there
probable cause to search, whether inside or outside of a container or
compartment of a car.
Once formed in terms of probable cause, the scope issue became
straightforward. In Carroll, the Fourth Amendment authorized agents
to tear open upholstery because the facts in the case would have led a
magistrate to issue a warrant to search for liquor secreted under the
rumble seat.157 The officers in Chambers lawfully looked in "a com-
partment under the dashboard" because probable cause in that case
would support a warrant to search in that area of the car. 58 In Husty,
"s4 Id. at 808.
' Id. at 824.
156 See id. at 823.
'57 See id. at 817-18.151 Id. at 818.
200]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
the Court upheld the search of containers ("whiskey bags") in a car
while Scher allowed the search of brown paper packages tied with
twine.1 59 In fact, since probable cause was the relevant yardstick in
these automobile exception cases, it appears no one even thought to
contest the scope of the official action as container-in-car searches.1
60
Ross should have stopped with the creation of its probable-
cause-determines-the-scope rule. However, Justice Stevens was aware
of one glaring flaw; Ross' reasoning was inconsistent with Sanders
and therefore risked offending the doctrine of stare decisis. The two
distinct doctrines resulting from the cases of Chadwick and Ross were
perhaps best explained by Justice Blackmun:
In Ross, the Court endeavored to distinguish between
Carroll, which governed the Ross automobile search, and
Chadwick, which governed the Sanders automobile search. It
held that the Carroll doctrine covered searches of automo-
biles when police had probable cause to search an entire ve-
hicle, but that the Chadwick doctrine governed searches of
luggage when the officers had probable cause to search only
a container within the vehicle. Thus, in a Ross situation, the
police could conduct a reasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment without obtaining a warrant, whereas in a Sand-
ers situation, the police had to obtain a warrant before they
searched.1
61
The Court, however, was not yet ready to recognize the practical
difficulties arising from these two lines of cases. As a fig leaf, Justice
Stevens maintained that Ross adhered to the Sanders holding, if not
its rationale. 162 However, the differences between the Carroll/Ross
and Chadwick/Sanders lines of precedent could not be so easily pa-
pered over. Troubles flowing from the fault line between automobiles
and closed containers surfaced only three years later in United States
v. Johns.
163
In Johns, a United States Customs officer, pursuant to an inves-
tigation of a "suspected drug smuggling operation," alerted other offi-
cers to conduct ground and air surveillance of two pickup trucks as
they drove 100 miles to a remote private airstrip some 50 miles from
the Mexican border.164 Soon after the trucks reached the airstrip, a
159 See id. at 818-19.
'60 See id. at 819.
161 California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 572 (1991).
162 See Ross, 456 U.S. at 824.
163 469 U.S. 478 (1984).
"A See id. at 480.
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small aircraft landed. 65 Customs Officers in the air reported to those
on the ground that one of the pickups had approached the plane.
166
Soon, the aircraft departed, followed by a second plane, which landed
later, and then departed. 167
When two ground officers approached, one saw a person cover-
ing the contents of one of the trucks with a blanket. 68 Both officers
then smelled the odor of marijuana and saw in the back of the trucks
"packages wrapped in dark green plastic and sealed with tape.' 69 The
officers knew from prior experience that smuggled marijuana was
commonly packaged in this manner. 70 Therefore, the Customs offi-
cials arrested the smugglers and took the trucks back to the Drug En-
forcement Administration (DEA) headquarters in Tucson.' 7 1 Agents
took the packages from the trucks and placed them in a DEA ware-
house, apparently not performing a search of these containers until
three days after they were initially seized. 172 No search warrant was
obtained to support the searches.
173
Relying on Ross, the defendants sought suppression of the mari-
juana found in the packages. 74 Since the officers never had probable
cause that contraband was somewhere in the vehicle, but instead spe-
cifically knew that it was the packages that held the marijuana, Ross'
automobile exception was inapplicable. 75 Instead, officers faced a
Chadwick situation where they needed to obtain a warrant before
searching a closed container.
176
Countering this contention required some finesse. Justice
O'Connor, writing for the Court, asserted that although the officers
"no doubt suspected that the scent was emanating from the packages,"
they had formed probable cause as to the vehicles themselves. 177 Jus-
tice O'Connor offered:
The events surrounding the rendezvous of the aircraft and the
pickup trucks at the isolated desert strip indicated that the ve-
hicles were involved in smuggling activity. The Customs of-
ficers on the ground were unable to observe the airplanes af-
1'6 See id.
'6 See id.
167 See id.
'6' See id.
169 Id. at 480-81.
170 See id. at 481.
171 See id.
' See id.
'7- See id.
'74 See id. at 482.
175 See id.
176 See id.
'77 See id.
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ter they landed, and consequently did not see the packages
loaded into the pickup trucks. After the officers came closer
and detected the distinct odor of marihuana, they had prob-
able cause to believe that the vehicles contained contra-
band.17
8
In contrast, O'Connor reasoned for the Johns Court, that in
Chadwick, police "had probable cause to believe that a footlocker
contained contraband," and therefore it only provided precedent for
containers. 179 Justice O'Connor reiterated that Chadwick was not an
automobile exception case: "Chadwick ... did not involve the excep-
tion to the warrant requirement in Carroll v. United States ... be-
cause the police had no probable cause to believe that the automobile,
as contrasted to the footlocker, contained contraband."18 Thus, Johns
reaffirmed the distinction first offered in Ross between Carroll's
probable cause in vehicles generally and Chadwick's probable cause
in containers that happened to be placed in vehicles.
The Court finally acknowledged Ross' strain on logic in Califor-
nia v. Acevedo. 181 In Acevedo, Santa Ana police officer Coleman re-
ceived a package of marijuana from a federal drug enforcement agent
in Hawaii. 182 Officer Coleman learned that federal agents had seized
the package, originally bound for a J.R. Daza in Santa Ana via Fed-
eral Express.183 Officer Coleman took the package, after verifying its
contents, to the Federal Express Office, where Jamie Daza arrived to
claim and accept the package at about 10:30 a.m.'"8 Daza then took
the package back to his apartment. 85 When, at 11:45 a.m., officers
saw Daza leave his apartment and drop the box and paper that had
held the marijuana into the trash, Officer Coleman left to get a search
warrant. 186 At 12:05 p.m., officers saw and stopped Richard St.
George, who was leaving Daza's apartment with a half-full knap-
sack. 187 Officers then recovered one and a half pounds of marijuana
from the knapsack. 88 At 12:30, Charles Acevedo entered Daza's
apartment, coming back out about ten minutes later carrying "a brown
paper bag that looked full.' ' 189 Acevedo placed the bag, which officers
178 Id.
179 See id.
18 Id. at 482-83 (citations omitted).
181 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
'8 See id. at 566-67.
'83 See id. at 567.
'84 See id.
185 See id.
'86 See id.
'87 See id.
'8' See id.
189 Id.
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noticed "was the size of one of the wrapped marijuana packages sent
from Hawaii," in the trunk of his car and started to drive away.190 Of-
ficers then stopped Acevedo's car, opened the trunk and the bag, and
found marijuana.191
Faced with a warrantless search of a closed container about which
police had formed probable cause before it ever entered the car, the
Acevedo Court now directly faced the issue it side-stepped in Johns.
In resolving the conflict between Carroll-Ross (an automobile search
which comes across a container) and Chadwick-Sanders (a search of a
container which was placed in a car), the Court once again turned to
the Fourth Amendment, and its fundamental principle, probable
cause. Justice Blackmun, the author of Acevedo, reiterated Ross'
holding that "a warrantless search of an automobile under the Carroll
doctrine could include a search of a container or package found inside
the car when such a search was supported by probable cause."
192
Thus, the probable cause, which supported the search in the first
place, also determined its ultimate scope. A search could even be a
"probing" one, "so long as the search is supported by probable
cause."
193
Thus, probable cause became a leveler creating equal treatment
for containers whether police had formed their probable cause in the
container before or after it was placed in a car. Justice Blackmun was
even more specific:
We now agree that a container found after a general search of
the automobile and a container found in a car after a limited
search for the container are equally easy for the police to
store and for the suspect to hide or destroy. In fact, we see no
principled distinction in terms of either the privacy expecta-
tion or the exigent circumstances between the paper bag
found by the police in Ross and the paper bag found by the
police here.1
94
The Acevedo Court took care to note that its probable cause-based
rule was more protective of Fourth Amendment privacy than the Ross
decision. Under Ross:
If police know that they may open a bag only if they are ac-
tually searching the entire car, they may search more exten-
"0 See id.
191 See id.
192 Id. at 570.
19.3 Id.
'94 Id. at 574.
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sively than they otherwise would in order to establish the
general probable cause required by Ross.... We cannot see
the benefit of a rule that requires law enforcement officers to
conduct a more intrusive search in order to justify a less in-
trusive one.
195
The Acevedo Court instead held that "the Fourth Amendment
does not compel separate treatment for an automobile search that ex-
tends to a container within the vehicle" due to the "minimal protec-
tion to privacy afforded by the Chadwick-Sanders rule, and our seri-
ous doubt whether that rule substantially serves privacy interests"'
96
Thus, in the 1990s, the Court reasserted the important role prob-
able cause played in Carroll's automobile exception. In clarifying the
rule in Ross, the Acevedo Court reiterated that probable cause is the
compass for the automobile exception. This is demonstrated by the
words of Justice Blackmun in Acevedo: "[T]he police may search
without a warrant if their search is supported by probable cause."'
197
11. WYOMING V. HOUGHTON
A. Factual Background
In the "early morning hours" of July 23, 1995, Wyoming High-
way Patrol Officer Delane Baldwin stopped a 1977 Cadillac traveling
east on Interstate 25 in Natrona County.198 Officer Baldwin had pulled
the automobile over for speeding and a burned out brake light. 99
Soon after this stop, two other law enforcement officers joined Offi-
cer Baldwin at the scene.2°° The car held three occupants, all in its
front seat: the driver, David Young, Young's girlfriend, and Sandra
Houghton.201 Ms. Sandra Houghton was seated farthest from the
driver. 02 When Officer Baldwin asked Young for his driver's license,
registration, and insurance certificate, he "noticed a hypodermic sy-
ringe plainly visible in Mr. Young's left front shirt pocket., 20 3 In re-
sponse, Officer Baldwin retrieved gloves from his patrol car and in-
19s Id. at 574-75.
196 Id. at 576.
197 Id. at 579.
198 See Brief for Petitioner at 2, Wyoming v. Houghton, 119 S. Ct. 1297 (1999) (No. 98-
184) [hereinafter Petitioner's Brief].
199 See id.
200 See Houghton v. State, 956 P.2d 363, 365 (Wyo. 1998), rev'd, 119 S. Ct. 1297 (1999).
201 See id.
=- "All the occupant [sic] were on the front seat, with respondent Houghton located at the
end next to the passenger door." Petitioner's Brief at 2.
W3 id.
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structed Young to exit the vehicle and place the syringe on the car's
hood.2° Young complied.2 °5 When Officer Baldwin asked Young
why he had a syringe, Young replied, "with refreshing candor," that
he used it to take drugs.2°
The back-up officers then ordered the two passengers to exit the
Cadillac and provide identification.20 7 Houghton identified herself as
either "Sandra Jones"208 or "Sandra James" 2°9 and further claimed not
to have identification.2 10 The officers then patted down all the occu-
pants, "to see if there were any weapons or anything."21' When these
pat downs "yielded no weapons or contraband, the officers searched
the car for drugs. 212
Officer Baldwin based his search of the car on "the syringe and
Mr. Young's statement that he used the syringe to take drugs. 2 3
During this search, Officer Baldwin found a "closed lady's cloth
purse on the middle of the back seat., 214 Later, at a suppression hear-
ing, Officer Baldwin would admit "he had no probable cause to
search Ms. Houghton and that men do not usually carry purses. 215
Nonetheless, at the scene, Officer Baldwin opened and searched the
purse, removing from it a wallet, which he also searched.216 The wal-
let contained Houghton's photo driver's license, identifying her as
"Sandra K. Houghton. ' '217 Confronted with this evidence, Houghton
admitted the purse was hers and explained her false name was "in
case things went bad.
' 218
With no further comment, Officer Baldwin continued his search
of the purse, recovering and opening a brown "wallet bag" containing
drug paraphernalia, a syringe filled with about 60 ccs of liquid that
proved to be methamphetamine, a black wallet holding more drug
paraphernalia, a vial, and another syringe with some 10 ccs of liquid
methamphetamine. 219 During Officer Baldwin's search, although
204 See id.
205 See id.
206 See Wyoming v. Houghton, 119 S. Ct. 1297, 1299 (1999).
207 See id. at 2; Houghton v. State, 956 P.2d 363, 365 (Wyo. 1998), rev'd, 119 S. Ct. 1297
(1999).
2"8 See Houghton, 956 P.2d at 365.
209 Petitioner's Brief at 2.
210 See id.
211 Houghton, 956 P.2d at 365 (internal quotation marks omitted).
212 Id.
213 Petitioner's Brief at 3.
214 Id.
215 Respondent's Brief at 1.
216 See Houghton, 956 P.2d at 365.
217 See Petitioner's Brief at 3.
218 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
219 See id; Houghton, 956 P.2d at 365.
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Houghton had claimed ownership of the purse, she "selectively de-
nied ownership of some of the items pulled from the purse."220 After
taking the evidence into custody and finding fresh "needle track
marks" on Houghton's arms, Officer Baldwin arrested Houghton and
released Young and his girlfriend.22'
B. The Lower Court Rulings
The State of Wyoming charged Houghton with felony possession
of methamphetamine in a liquid amount greater than three-tenths of a
gram.222 Before trial, Houghton moved to suppress the evidence found
during Officer Baldwin's warrantless search, arguing that it violated
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. 23 The
district judge issued a decision letter denying the motion to suppress,
finding, "that the officer had probable cause to search the car for con-
traband and, therefore, any containers within the car which could hold
the contraband were subject to search., 224 A jury found Houghton
guilty of one count of felony possession of a controlled substance.2
25
Houghton, sentenced to two to three years incarceration, appealed to
the Wyoming Supreme Court.226
Chief Justice Taylor authored the opinion of the Wyoming Su-
preme Court in Houghton v. State.227 In framing the issue, the Chief
Justice demonstrated a keen awareness of the central role probable
cause plays in the automobile exception. Chief Justice Taylor de-
clared: "The issue before us is whether the personal belongings of a
passenger may be searched under the 'automobile exception' when
probable cause exists to search the automobile, but there is no prob-
able cause to believe the passenger is involved in criminal activity.,
22 8
Further, this formulation of the issue was a natural consequence
of how the litigants themselves drew their battle lines around prob-
able cause. Houghton asserted: "in the absence of probable cause to
believe she possessed contraband, the search of her purse violated her
justifiable expectation of privacy., 229 Likewise, the State of Wyomingitself spoke in terms of probable cause. The Chief Justice saw the
220 Petitioner's Brief at 3.
221 See id.; Houghton, 956 P.2d at 365.
222 See Wyoming v. Houghton, 119 S. Ct. 1297, 1299-00 (1999); see also WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 35-7-1031(c)(iii) (Lexis 1999) (providing the statutory language under which Houghton
was charged).
223 See Petitioner's Brief at 4.
224 Houghton, 956 P.2d at 365.
22' See id.
226 See id.
227 See iL at 364.
228 Id. at 366.
229 Id.
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government position as follows: "The State counters that the officers
had no duty to determine probable cause as to each container within
the car, and consequently, the permissible scope of the search in-
cluded the search of all containers, including a passenger's purse."230 -
For the State Supreme Court, Wyoming's assertion of power over
all containers came too close to a general search. The Chief Justice
reminded the government that: "General seizures are prohibited; all
searches must be supported by probable cause to believe evidence of
a crime will be found." 231 The Wyoming Supreme Court reasoned that
the Fourth Amendment forbade general searches whether with or
without a warrant.2 32 Certainly there existed a particularity require-
ment for warrants.2 33 Warrant exceptions must be equally limited,
because "[t]he scope of a search is defined by the probable cause
upon which that search is predicated, not whether that search is con-
ducted pursuant to a warrant or pursuant to a recognized exception to
the warrant requirement.
' 234
In Houghton v. State, the Wyoming Supreme Court therefore had
to determine if a magistrate, had she been consulted, would find prob-
able cause to search Houghton's purse. The probable cause yardstick
enabled Chief Justice Taylor to accurately measure the scope of Offi-
cer Baldwin's power:
[A]s Ross and Acevedo make clear, the permissible scope of
the warrantless search of [the driver's] car under the automo-
bile exception is identical to a search conducted pursuant to a
warrant. The problem in this case is that while Houghton's
purse could physically contain the object of the search, there
was no probable cause to believe that contraband would be
found in her personal belongings.235
The Wyoming Supreme Court reversed Houghton's conviction,
finding that the officers did not have probable cause to search her
personal effects and had "no reason to believe that contraband had
been placed within the purse."
236
230 Id.
231 Id.
2' See id.
3 See id.
234 Id. (emphasis in original) (relying on Ross, where the Wyoming Supreme court noted:
"The Supreme Court of the United States has unequivocally held that '[t]he scope of a warrant-
less search based on probable cause is no narrower-and no broader-than the scope of a search
authorized by a warrant supported by probable cause"') (quoting United States v. Ross, 456
U.S. 798,823 (1982)).
235 Houghton v. State, 956 P.2d 363, 365 (Wyo. 1998), rev'd, 119 S. Ct. 1297 (1999).
236 Id. at 372.
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C. The U.S. Supreme Court's Ruling in Houghton
Justice Scalia, who authored the Court's opinion in Wyoming v.
Houghton,237 structured his analysis into two sections. 38 The first
analytical route ostensibly considered the historical evidence of the
Fourth Amendment: "In determining whether a particular govern-
mental action violates this provision, we inquire first whether the ac-
tion was regarded as an unlawful search or seizure under the common
law when the Amendment was framed., 239 The Court's analysis next
shifted to employing a balancing approach to reasonableness:
Where [the historical] inquiry yields no answer, we must
evaluate the search or seizure under traditional standards of
reasonableness by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to
which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the
other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of
legitimate governmental interests.24°
In Houghton, Justice Scalia began his historical analysis with a
review of Carroll, which he asserted "similarly involved the war-
rantless search of a car that law enforcement officials had probable
cause to believe contained contraband. 241 The Houghton Court cor-
rectly noted that Carroll went back to the time of the framers to ex-
plore the reasonableness of the automobile exception.242 However, no
where in its analysis is there even a brief mention of Carroll's elabo-
rate- efforts to adhere to the fundamentals of the warrant preference
and probable cause. After his brief summary of the Carroll opinion,
Justice Scalia offered a mere sentence fragment from Carroll as that
case's holding: "[T]he [Carroll] Court held that 'contraband goods
concealed and illegally transported in an automobile or other vehicle
may be searched for without a warrant' where probable cause ex-
ists."243 Here, crucial language was omitted from the end of Hough-
ton's quotation of Carroll. The language as it originally appeared in
Carroll was as follows: "Having thus established that contraband
goods concealed and illegally transported in an automobile or other
vehicle may be for searched for without a warrant, we come now to
consider under what circumstances such a search may be made."24
217 119 S.Ct. 1297, 1299 (1999).
2'8 See id. at 1300-04 (1999).
239 Id. at 1300.
240 Id.
241 Id.
242 See id.
243 Id. (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925)).
244 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925) (emphasis added).
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The "circumstances" wording, omitted from Houghton, is critical,
for it speaks against a per se rule and in favor of case-by-case analysis
of facts for probable cause. Indeed, Carroll would deem an automatic
right to search, reaching beyond the probable cause limit, inexcus-
able: "It would be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition agent
were authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding
liquor and thus subject all persons lawfully using the highways to the
inconvenience and indignity of such a search."245
Similarly, Houghton may have taken artistic license with Ross.
Justice Scalia found the following language supportive: "If probable
cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the
search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal
the object of the search."246 Interestingly, and perhaps tellingly,
Houghton did not sense a need to italicize the limiting portion of
Ross' phrase, "that may conceal the object of the search."247
The Houghton Court next aimed to strengthen its own position by
contrasting it with a non-argument. Rather than consider the actual
lack of probable cause to intrude into Houghton's purse (regardless of
ownership as to the purse), the Court argued that the automobile ex-
ception should apply equally to the driver's and passenger's articles.
Here, Houghton bolstered its reasoning with the dog that didn't bark.
Justice Scalia noted that, "our later cases describing Ross have char-
acterized it as applying broadly to all containers within a car, without
qualification as to ownership." 248 The Court did acknowledge as true
that "there was no passenger in Ross, and it was not claimed that the
package in the trunk belonged to anyone other than the driver."
249
Still, Justice Scalia found it curious that any such "substantial limita-
tion" as restricting the search to only those items belonging to the
driver was not expressed.20 Here, the absence of language is grasped
at in order to support the expansion of official powers.
In arguing against the red herring that there should be a differ-
ence in treatment between the driver's and the passenger's belong-
ings, Houghton seemed to unknowingly stumble across crucial lan-
guage from the Ross opinion. Justice Scalia noted: "Ross concluded
from the historical evidence that the permissible scope of a warrant-
less car search 'is defined by the object of the search and the places in
245 Id. at 153-54.
246 Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1301 (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 835 (1982))
(emphasis in original).
247 Il (quoting Ross, 456 U.S. at 825).
248 Id. (emphasis in original).
249 Id.
210 See id.
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which there is probable cause to believe that it may be found."'' l Of
course, this is the key; the search should extend to only those places
where probable cause to believe the item will be found actually exists.
Proof that the Houghton Court conveniently missed the signifi-
cance of Ross' limiting language came in Houghton's next paragraph.
There, Justice Scalia stated Houghton's rule defining the scope of the
automobile exception: "When there is probable cause to search for
contraband in a car, it is yeasonable for police officers-like customs
officials in the Founding era-to examine packages and containers
without a showing of individualized probable cause for each one.
' ' 2
This statement of a per se right to search all containers regardless of
probable cause as to each container was directly contrary to the lan-
guage Houghton had just quoted from Ross. Thus, the Court's view of
the automobile exception's history seemed to suffer some blind spots.
Even though the Houghton Court was convinced that the "his-
torical evidence" unequivocally supported the government's search,
the Court still proceeded to balance the interests in the case. Here,
Justice Scalia pronounced passengers' privacy expectations as "re-
duced" due to the following factors: (1) the car's traveling in "public
thoroughfares;" (2) the "pervasive governmental controls" over vehi-
cles; (3) the failure of passengers to use cars as "the repository of per-
sonal effects;" and (4) the exposure to the possibility of "traffic acci-
dents," which might "render all their contents open to public scru-
tiny. 253
While the passenger's privacy expectations were thus "consid-
erably diminished," the government's interests remained "substan-
tial."5 4 Much of the state interest turned upon the passenger's guilt by
association with the driver. Justice Scalia worried that, "a car passen-
ger ... will often be engaged in a common enterprise with the driver,
and have the same interest in concealing the fruits or the evidence of
their wrongdoing." 55 After all, a passenger's mere "presence in the
car with the driver provided more, rather than less, reason to believe
that the two were in league. ' z 6 Passengers also ran the risk of being
dupes: "A criminal might be able to hide contraband in a passenger's
belongings as readily as in other containers in the car ... perhaps
251 Id. (quoting Ross, 456 U.S. at 824).
252 Id.
253 See id. at 1302 (internal quotation marks omitted).
2'4 See id.
25 id.
216 Id. at 1303.
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even surreptitiously, without the passenger's knowledge or permis-
sion. ,, 5
7
Such scenarios led the Court to conclude that the interests bal-
anced "[in] favor of the needs of law enforcement, and against a per-
sonal-privacy interest that is ordinarily weak." 58 Both its tailored
view of history and its assumptions about the relative interests in the
case led the Houghton Court's to its final conclusion: "We hold that
police officers with probable cause to search a car may inspect pas-
sengers' belongings found in the car that are capable of concealing
the object of the search."' 9
Ill. THE IMPLICATIONS OF HOUGHTON'S EXPANSION OF THE
AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION
Justice Scalia's opinion in Houghton is a study in selective cita-
tion. At the outset of the Court's analysis, Houghton quoted only the
reasonableness clause of the Fourth Amendment. The Court began:
"The Fourth Amendment protects '[t]he right of the people to be se-
cure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreason-
able searches and seizures.' ' 260 The omission of any mention of the
Warrant Clause was significant, for it demonstrated the Court's un-
derlying resistance to employ the Clause's restrictions on law en-
forcement.
Justice Scalia's intentional neglect of the Warrant Clause may be
shown by contrasting Houghton's opening analysis with that of an-
other Fourth Amendment case of the Court's, Maryland v. Dyson.
261
Dyson is particularly revealing for it not only came out during the
same term as Houghton, but also dealt with the same privacy concern:
the automobile exception.262 Dyson begins with a discussion that mir-
rors the Court's Fourth Amendment analysis for the last three-
quarters of the century.263 In Dyson, the Court noted: "The Fourth
Amendment generally requires police to secure a warrant before con-
ducting a search. ' 2 4
In contrast to Dyson and its other automobile exception cases
stretching back to Carroll, the Court in Houghton failed to acknowl-
edge the warrant requirement. Instead, Justice Scalia tried to pass off,
2S7 Id.
25 Id.
2s Id. at 1304.
260 Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV).
261 119 S. Ct. 2013 (1999).
262 See id.
263 See id. at 2014 (discussing the development of the automobile exception).
264 id.
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as business as usual, a novel two-pronged approach to Fourth
Amendment cases. To declare a violation, the Court must first decide
whether the government intrusion would have been "regarded as an
unlawful search or seizure under the common law" at the time of
framing.265 Of course, this portion of Justice Scalia's test, which ex-
plores original intent, is far from revolutionary. Indeed, if performed
properly, it would lead the Court back to Carroll's review of the laws
of the original Congresses.266 Yet, as we shall see below, when per-
formed improperly, it can undo decades of precedent, creating confu-
sion and uncertainty.
Moreover, the Court's second avenue of analysis represented a
truly new, and dangerous, innovation. Should Justice Scalia's review
of the common law fail to adequately inform the Court on the Fourth
Amendment, he declared: "[W]e must evaluate the search or seizure
under traditional standards of reasonableness by assessing, on the one
hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy
and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion
of legitimate governmental interests." 267 Thus, Houghton created a
new backdrop for every Fourth Amendment case; if the Justices find
the text and history unsatisfactory, they may proceed with their own
balancing of interests in the individual case.
A. Houghton's Unique View of History and Court Precedent
Close examination reveals that Justice Scalia's investigation of
the "historical evidence" 268 is less objective fact than it is personal
viewpoint. Examples of this subjectivity appear immediately in the
Court's opinion. In the first sentence reviewing the Court's precedent,
Justice Scalia announced, "It is uncontested in the present case that
the police officers had probable cause to believe there were illegal
drugs in the car.' 269 With this concession going in the government's
favor, Justice Scalia was quick to rely on the defendant's failure to
argue the point as creating probable cause in fact.
However, Justice Scalia has not always rushed to embrace the
factual record established by conceded contentions. In California v.
Hodari, it was the government that failed to present an argument by
conceding that the officer who stopped the defendant in that case "did
not have the 'reasonable suspicion' required to justify stopping Ho-
26s Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1300.
See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149-53 (1925) (discussing statutes passed by
the First, Second, and Fourth Congress, among others).
267 Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1300.
2 See id.
269 id-
580 [Vol. 50:547
IMPROBABLE CAUSE
da '." 270 Despite the concession, Justice Scalia could not resist delving
into the facts on the issue: "That it would be unreasonable to stop, for
brief inquiry, young men who scatter in panic upon the mere sighting
of the police is not self-evident, and arguably contradicts proverbial
common sense."271 He then went on to quote the relevant proverb:
"The wicked flee when no man pursueth. 27z
Further, in arguing that Houghton conceded probable cause in
the car, the Court avoided the true battleground: the lack of probable
cause in Houghton's purse. It is the disparity between the scope of the
justification to search (as based on probable cause), and the scope of
the search actually conducted that needs to be addressed. Yet, the
Court, by quickly seizing upon a concession about the car, glossed
over the true issue presented by Officer Baldwin's intrusion of
Houghton's purse.
If, as Justice Scalia determined, deciding the Fourth Amendment
issue in this case required a review of the "historical evidence,"
273
then such an examination arguably should include all of the pertinent
historical evidence. Neither any case nor any fact should be over-
looked. However, in discussing probable cause to search the car,
Houghton never offered a definition of probable cause itself. Perhaps,
in light of the definitions offered in such seminal cases as Carroll 274
and Illinois v. Gates, 75 the Court in Houghton felt no need to revisit
the meaning of this fundamental level of certainty.
This is unfortunate, because a brief refresher of the Gates test
might have led the Court to a more careful analysis of the facts in
Houghton.z76 In Gates, the Court repeatedly concluded that probable
"0 California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621,623 n.1 (1991).
271 Id.
272 Id. (quoting Proverbs 28:1).
2 Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1300.
274 In Carroll, the Court defined probable cause as follows: "If the facts and circumstances
before the officer are such as to warrant a man of prudence and caution in believing that the
offense has been committed, it is sufficient." Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161(1925)
(quoting Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642, 645 (1878)). In applying its automobile exception, the
Carroll Court decided a further reference to the test of probable cause was in order.
[I]t is clear that the officers here had justification for the search and seizure. This is
to say that the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had
reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient in themselves to warrant a man
of reasonable caution in the belief that intoxicating liquor was being transported in
the automobile which they stopped and searched.
Id. at 162.
275 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
276 Gates involved the assessment of probable cause in the warrant context. See id. at 235
(discussing the non-technical nature of the issuing of most search warrants). However, as previ-
ously noted, Ross equated the scope of a search pursuant to a warrant and a search pursuant to
the automobile exception: "Carroll 'merely relaxed the requirements for a warrant on grounds
of practicability.' It neither broadened nor limited the scope of a lawful search based on prob-
able cause." United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820 (1982).
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cause was an exercise in weighing the "totality of the circum-
stances. 2 77 Further, as shown in the review of the Court's automobile
exception precedent in Part II above, the Court has backed its "totality
of circumstances" words with deeds. Over the decades, from Carroll
to Acevedo, the Court consistently adhered to considering all the facts
surrounding the probable cause issue by probing the myriad details
involved in probable cause determinations.
278
Further, Gates' totality of the circumstances approach is not to
be applied in blanket fashion to an entire area. Instead, the Court in
Gates took care to focus its inquiry to the narrow question of
"whether there is 'probable cause' to believe that contraband or evi-
dence is located in a particular place.
' 279
If, in Houghton, the trouble were taken to follow Gates' mandate
of considering all the facts surrounding the search, and further care
was exercised in clearly identifying the precise location of the search,
the details would have pointed to a different conclusion regarding the
existence of probable cause in Houghton's purse. Justice Scalia noted
that, while questioning the driver, the Highway Patrol officer "noticed
a hypodermic syringe in Young's shirt pocket."280 Additionally, when
asked why he had the syringe, the driver, "with refreshing candor,"
answered that "he used it to take drugs. '281 The Houghton Court
seemingly would base probable cause on these two facts alone, for
without criticism, it then related that, "in light of Young's admission,"
the officers proceeded to search the passenger compartment of the car
and open the purse found in the back seat.282
Yet, the recitation of these few facts should be only the begin-
ning of the probable cause "totality of the circumstances" analysis. A
full consideration of all of Houghton's facts presents less justification
of even a search of the car's passenger compartment than in previous
cases. For instance, merely possessing paraphernalia for drug use is
quite different from the detailed evidence of the transportation for
sale of contraband liquor in Carroll.
277 The Gates Court followed the "totality of the circumstances" rule. See, e.g., Gates, 462
U.S. at 230 ("This totality-of-the-circumstances approach is far more consistent with our prior
treatment of probable cause ...."); id. at 233 (discussing the "totality-of-the-circumstances
analysis that traditionally has guided probable cause determinations"); id. at 234 (arguing that "a
totality-of-the-circumstances analysis ... permits a balanced assessment of the relative weights
of all the various indicia of reliability"); id. at 238 ("[w]e reaffirm the totality-of-the-
circumstances analysis that has traditionally informed probable-cause determinations.").
278 See supra Part II (discussing the evolution of probable cause in the context of the auto-
mobile exception).
279 Gates, 462 U.S. at 230 (emphasis added).
m Wyoming v. Houghton, 119 S. Ct. 1297, 1299 (1999).
281 Id.
2n id.
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Probable cause existed in Carroll due to a wealth of convincing
details. First, police recognized the car they stopped as being the one
driven by known bootleggers ("the Carroll boys") who had previously
entered into an ageement to sell illicit liquor to agents in an under-
cover operation.283 At this previous meeting, the defendants had
agreed to sell three cases of illegal whiskey at a specified price of
$130 a case.284 Only one week after the attempted undercover buy,
while patrolling a road frequently used by bootleggers, the officers
saw Carroll's Oldsmobile Roadster driving and followed the Carroll
boys until they "lost trace of them."285 This road was a favorite of the
rumrunners because it ran from the neighborhood of Detroit, which
was near the international boundary and therefore a source city for
alcohol. 8 6 Police could surmise that, since it was driven to a negotia-
tion for sale and seen on the route from Detroit, Carroll's car was it-
self an instrumentality used to carry illegal liquor. About two months
after the previous encounter, the officers again saw the Roadster, this
time heading from Detroit to Grand Rapids.287 Since alcohol was
smuggled from Detroit, and officers knew, due to their undercover
meeting with Carroll, that his market was Grand Rapids, they could
reasonably conclude that the car was presently filled with illicit liq-
uor.288 All of these facts combined together to establish that at the
moment the car was stopped, there was a substantial likelihood that
contraband would be found in the car.
Furthermore, as noted above, the Court had previously estab-
lished a consistent track record of discipline in looking at the totality
of circumstances in each case. In precedent such as Brinegar, Cham-
bers, Ross, and Acevedo, the Court never shirked from its duty of
weighing all the facts to establish whether probable cause existed to
support the search.
In comparison to the Court's earlier automobile exception juris-
prudence, Houghton stands out as an ugly aberration. There is simply
a dearth of factual analysis in Houghton; Young was found with a
syringe and openly admitted his personal drug use. Before jumping to
the conclusion that drugs were present in the car, the Court should
... See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 134-35 (1925) (describing prior efforts of
undercover agents to buy liquor from the bootleggers); id. at 160 (pointing out that "the Carroll
boys" were known by the agencts to be bootleggers).
"" See id. at 134-35 (describing details of agent's attempt to buy illegal whiskey from the
bootleggers).
2S5 Id. at 135.
286 See id. at 160 (describing Detroit as "one of the most active centers for introduction
illegally into [the U.S.] spirituous liquors for distribution into the interior").
2' See id. at 135 (describing details of the Carroll search).
2 See id. at 162 (concluding that the search was reasonable in light of the facts known to
the agents at the time).
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have taken the trouble to weigh the import of the facts. For instance,
unlike bootlegging, the car of a person who uses drugs has no special
relationship to the crime of drug possession. A person holding contra-
band for personal use may inject his or her drugs in virtually any lo-
cation, whether it is at home, in a car, or in a park. Further, many us-
ers possess only so much of a drug for one dose, and thus run out af-
ter only one use. This fact enables officers, trained to know the typi-
cal habits of use and sale of controlled substances, to testify whether a
particular amount of a drug is being held for personal use or for sale.
Therefore, the mere existence of paraphernalia might not necessarily
lead a person of reasonable caution to believe drugs are in the car.
Moreover, one of the facts relied upon by Houghton could actu-
ally point away from probable cause to believe drugs were in the car.
Justice Scalia wryly characterized Young's admission as given with
"refreshing candor." 289 Additionally, Young allowed his syringe to be
"plainly visible" in his left front shirt pocket.290 Such open behavior is
hardly the norm for the typical trafficker carrying drugs in his car.291
Perhaps a complete review of all Houghton's circumstances would
still point to probable cause in the car. However, the discussion of the
few facts relied on in Houghton provided a much less credible con-
clusion than those existing in Carroll and its progeny. Indeed, the
Court has decided several cases where one of the facts indicating the
presence of contraband is the evasion or nervousness of the suspect.
292
If Houghton would argue that people have been known to unac-
countably admit guilt to officers, it would still seem inconsistent to
both advertise one's drug use with an open display of a syringe and a
candid admission of use, while at the same time conceal drug use by
hiding the drugs in another's purse.
29 Wyoming v. Houghton, 119 S. Ct. 1297, 1299 (1999).
290 See Petitioner's Brief at 2.
291 For instance, the Court has previously noted that: "Contraband goods rarely are strewn
across the trunk or floor of a car, since by their very nature such goods must be withheld from
public view, they rarely can be placed in an automobile unless they are enclosed within some
form of container." United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820 (1982). Thus, the typical behavior
of one holding drugs is to conceal the signs of their existence, not to flaunt them.
292 See, e.g., Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 6 (1984) (per curiam), in which the Court
found the following evasive behavior relevant to the justification for an official intrusion:
Before the officers even spoke to the three confederates, one by one they had sighted
the plainclothes officers and had spoken furtively to one another. One was twice
overheard urging the others to "get out of here." Respondent's strange movements in
his attempts to evade the officers aroused further justifiable suspicion ....
Id.
Similarly, the Court relied upon the suspect's nervousness in supporting official action
in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 548 (1979) ("Mhe respondent 'became quite
shaken, extremely nervous. She has a hard time speaking.').
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This, of course, is the largest leap required in Houghton. Even
with probable cause in the car conceded, probable cause to believe
that the purse contained contraband could not be established. Officer
Baldwin himself recognized as much. He testified during the suppres-
sion hearing that he had "no probable cause to search Ms. Hough-
ton."293 Further, a purse is a uniquely gender-based container typically
possessed only by women.294 The driver was a male, making the
likely owner of the purse one of the two female passengers. To find
probable cause in the purse itself would either require a willing blind-
ness to these particular facts or to the precedent mandating probable
cause support the entire reach of the search.
Houghton perhaps chose a bit if both. Certainly the Court dem-
onstrated blissful ignorance of automobile exception precedent. The
distorted view of this doctrine's history began with Justice Scalia's
reference to Carroll itself. In the Court's opinion, he attempted to
equate Houghton with the original automobile exception case:
"Carroll v. United States... similarly involved the warrantless search
of a car that law enforcement officials had probable cause to believe
contained contraband-in that case, bootleg liquor."295 In reality, the
similarity ends upon Officer Baldwin's opening of Houghton's purse,
for, unlike the Wyoming Highway Patrol officer, the federal agents in
Carroll not only had probable cause to search the Carroll Boy's car,
but also to tear up its upholstery. Carroll and his confederate were
experienced bootleggers travelling under cover of night on a route
frequented by smugglers from a source city to their usual market. As
noted in Ross, rarely is contraband "strewn across the trunk or floor of
a car.' 296 Such open exposure would be even less likely when the
contraband in question is being transported by seasoned traffickers
aware they were being watched by police. Thus, quite unlike Hough-
ton, Carroll presents a case where law enforcement had probable
cause to perform a more probing search of the car and its containers.
The gap between Houghton's reading of the historical evidence
and the Court's actual precedents only widened with the discussion of
Ross. Justice Scalia cited Ross for support, asserting, "we upheld as
reasonable the warrantless search of a paper bag and leather pouch
found in the trunk of the defendant's car by officers who had probable
cause to believe that the trunk contained drugs. 297 What Houghton
here conveniently overlooked was that Ross upheld the search of the
73 Respondent's Brief at 1.
294 The officer himself acknowledged that "[M]en do not usually carry purses." Id.
295 Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1300 (citation omitted).
296 Ross, 456 U.S. at 820.
297 Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1300.
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bag and pouch because the officers also had probable cause to search
these very containers. Otherwise, the Ross Court would not have
committed itself to the following rule: "The scope of a warrantless
search of an automobile.., is defined by the object of the search and
the places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be
found. ,98
Apparently, the Houghton Court would have us believe that the
language "the places in which there is probable cause to believe that it
may be found" in Ross refers simply to a qualification that the sought
contraband or evidence could physically fit in the searched container.
Hence Houghton's holding that officers possessing probable cause to
search a car may search belongings within the car which "are capable
of concealing the object of the search." 299 This strained reading of the
scope rule in Ross breaks down when the rest of the paragraph is con-
sidered, for Ross continued:
Just as probable cause to believe that a stolen lawnmower
may be found in a garage will not support a warrant to search
an upstairs bedro6m, probable cause to believe that undocu-
mented aliens are being transported in a van will not justify a
warrantless search of a suitcase. Probable cause to believe
that a container placed in the trunk of a taxi contains contra-
band or evidence does not justify a search of the entire cab.300
Certainly, Young's drugs could physically fit within Houghton's
purse. However, this fact alone would not satisfy Ross. The automo-
bile exception under Ross extended only so far as an officer had prob-
able cause. Officer Baldwin, faced with a male driver openly admit-
ting he possessed a syringe for drug use, had no more facts to connect
this illegal activity to a female's purse.
Justice Scalia's historical record became curiously quiet when
considering the Court's most recent decision delineating the scope of
the automobile exception, Acevedo. The majority opinion contained
only one mention of Acevedo, and this was in reference to what that
case did not say.30 1 Houghton offered the Acevedo case as an example
of how the Court's "later cases describing Ross have characterized it
as applying broadly to all containers within a car, without qualifica-
tion as to ownership. '302 The Court made a peculiar choice in focus-
29' Ross, 456 U.S. at 824.
299 Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1304.
'0 Ross, 456 U.S. at 824.
301 Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1301 (citing for support, California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565,
572 (1991)).
302 Id.
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ing its attention on this portion of Acevedo. As previously discussed,
drawing any inferences from the Court's earlier failure to indulge in
dicta is unwise at best. Discussing the scope of a search of a passen-
ger's container in Acevedo made about as much sense as discussing
any irrelevant point, such as consent to search or electronic surveil-
lance.
Yet, even more importantly, choosing only this one reference to
Acevedo meant ignoring other, more pertinent portions of that case. If
Houghton wished to detect in Acevedo a meaningful characterization
of Ross, it could have noted this statement of Ross' holding: "In
United States v. Ross . we held that a warrantless search of an
automobile under the Carroll doctrine could include a search of a
container or package found inside the car when such a search was
supported by probable cause.3 °3
Thus, when the automobile exception precedent is properly re-
viewed, by filling in the crucial portions omitted by Justice Scalia, it
becomes clear that Houghton's new rule represents a dramatic expan-
sion of official search power under the automobile exception. First,
the Court held: "that police officers with probable cause to search a
car may inspect passengers' belongings found in the car that are ca-
pable of concealing the object of the search."3°4 Next, it applied this
rule to enable an officer to search a container in which he had no
probable cause.
Despite Justice Scalia's assurances to the contrary, the formation
and application of Houghton's new rule does indeed do violence to
history. Unfortunately, this unnecessary break with the historical evi-
dence could undermine the protection provided by probable cause.
B. Houghton's Expansion and Distortion of the Fourth Amendment's
Balancing Analysis
The most curious portion of Houghton's Fourth Amendment dis-
cussion involved the Court's balancing of the competing interests of
the government and the individual. Perhaps doubting the persuasive
force of his own review of history, °s Justice Scalia offered a fallback
argument: "Even if the historical evidence ... were thought to be
equivocal, we would find that the balancing of the relative interests
weighs decidedly in favor of allowing searches of a passenger's be-
'0' Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 570 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
304 Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1304.
305 At the outset of his discussion in Houghton, Justice Scalia seemed to indicate that bal-
ancing would be used only when the historical inquiry "yields no answer." See id. at 1300.
Therefore, the mere presence of the Court's subsequent balancing analysis itself calls into ques-
tion the validity of Justice Scalia's historical analysis.
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1,306longings. What is radical about this argument is its very existence
in the case.
The balancing analysis, which Justice Scalia strained to charac-
terize as among the "traditional standards of reasonableness,"30 7 is an
aberration of basic doctrine formed during the activist Warren
Court.08 Indeed, it is ironic that the very Justice who has consistently
prided himself on divining the meaning of the Fourth Amendment by
studying the common law at the time of framing should find himself
grasping at an analytical straw which is at most only three decades
old. 309
Realizing the uniqueness of the balance-of-interests approach,
the Court has traditionally taken great care to limit its use to cases
involving "special needs, 310 in other words, governmental action out-
side the traditional context of criminal investigation. The limited ap-
plication of the "special needs" doctrine was best explained by Justice
Blackmun:
[W]e have used such a balancing test, rather than strictly ap-
plying the Fourth Amendment's Warrant and Probable-Cause
Clause, only when we were confronted with "a special law
enforcement need for greater flexibility.,
311
Justice Blackmun then referred to his opinion in U.S. v. Place, 462
U.S. 696 (1983), where he stated:
"While the Fourth Amendment speaks in terms of freedom
from unreasonable [searches], the Amendment does not
leave the reasonableness of most [searches] to the judgment
3o6 Id. at 1302.
307 See id. at 1300.
308 See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-25 (1968), in which the Court abandoned the
probable cause requirement in the setting of investigatory detentions by weighing the govern-
ment's interests in making such stops against individual interests of privacy; see also Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538-39 (1967), wherein the Court restructured the probable
cause analysis for administrative warrants from a probability inquiry to a balancing test.
309 Justice Scalia has repeatedly sought to focus the Court's Fourth Amendment analysis
on common law definitions and doctrines used at the time of framing. In Houghton, for exam-
ple, Justice Scalia stated: "In determining whether a particular governmental action violates this
provision, we inquire first whether the action was regarded as an unlawful search or seizure
under the common law when the Amendment was framed." Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1300; see
also Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 379 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("I take it to be a
fundamental principle of constitutional adjudication that the terms in the Constitution must be
given the meaning ascribed to them at the time of their ratification."); California v. Acevedo,
500 U.S. 565, 583-84 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing for a return to the common law
rules governing the requirements for warrants); California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624-27
(1991) (consulting the common law to determine the definition of seizure of a person).
310 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
311 Id. (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,514 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
[Vol. 50:547
IMPROBABLE CAUSE
of courts or government officers; the Framers of the
Amendment balanced the interests involved and decided that
a [search] is reasonable only if supported by a judicial war-
rant based on probable cause."
312
Justice Scalia himself knew that his balancing analysis was to be
restricted to only cases involving special needs. This is apparent by
his citation in support of his use of the balancing approach.313 In it, he
specifically mentioned Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton,314 a
case involving the special needs of maintaining a safe school envi-
ronment for students.315 Justice Scalia had to be aware of the limits of
Vernonia's analysis for he wrote the majority opinion in the case.316
Despite special needs' limits, Justice Scalia employed this unique
analysis in a case having nothing to do with special needs. Houghton
was a traditional case involving Fourth Amendment constraints upon
an investigation seeking evidence of criminality. 317 Thus, Houghton's
use of special needs balancing represents a dramatic expansion of po-
lice search powers in criminal investigations. Justice Scalia, the
Court's self-appointed strict constructionist, extended the reach of a
novel doctrine which has no textual basis in the Fourth Amendment
and no track record in the common law at the time of framing. Fur-
ther, this dangerous innovation was, according to Justice Scalia, un-
necessary, for the Court had already disposed of the issue in Hough-
ton by sifting through historical evidence.3 18
Further, even if we were to accept the leap in logic that special
needs balancing should apply in Houghton, the Court's balancing
analysis failed on its own terms. In weighing individual interests,
Justice Scalia argued that passengers "possess a reduced expectation
of privacy with regard to the property that they transport in cars. 319
This is due to a variety of factors. Cars travel "public thoroughfares,"
312 111 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983)).
313 See Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1300.
314 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
315 Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1300; see also Vemonia, 515 U.S. at 653 (finding that:
Where a search is undertaken by law enforcement officials to discover evidence
of criminal wrongdoing, this Court has said that reasonableness generally requires
the obtaining of a judicial warrant. But a warrant is not required to establish the
reasonableness of all government searches .... A search unsupported by prob-
able cause can be constitutional, we have said, "when special needs, beyond the
normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable cause require-
ment impracticable") (citations omitted).
316 See id. at 648.
317 As previously discussed, Houghton involved an officer searching an automobile for
illegal drugs and ultimately arresting the passenger for drug possession. See Houghton, 119 S.
Ct. at 1299.
3,8 See id. at 1302.
319 id.
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"seldom serve as... the repository of personal effects," are subjected
to "'pervasive' governmental controls," and "are exposed to traffic
accidents that may render all their contents open to public scru-
tiny."32
0
Yet, perhaps a passenger's interests are not as minor as Hough-
ton would deem. The idea that cars seldom act as repositories of per-
sonal effects might be dated. It comes from South Dakota v. Opper-
man, a 1976 case.32' Today, with minivans carrying diaper bags, pa-
tients picking up prescriptions at drive though pharmacies, and pro-
fessionals bringing sensitive documents home for work in the eve-
nings, many people rely on their vehicles to hold personal effects.
What may be more troubling is the privacy-lessening factor
newly crafted by the Houghton Court. Now, the risk of a traffic colli-
sion which could expose "all" of a car's contents "to public scrutiny"
erodes privacy expectations to such a degree that police can invade a
purse found in a car.322 The Court could not be talking about the typi-
cal fender-bender; it would seem that in only the most violent traffic
accidents would a purse actually fly out of a car and empty its con-
tents. It is curious that daily privacy expectations can be so effectively
shrunk by a worse case scenario. Imagine if the same logic applied to
the most private of possessions, the home. Conceivably, a. house is
exposed to all sorts of disasters: fires, floods, hurricanes, tornadoes,
and earthquakes. This does not include human intrusions from loot-
ing, peeping, or burglary. Such worse case scenarios do not lessen the
expectation of privacy traditionally accorded homes.
If the Court has discounted the interests of the individual, it has
certainly inflated any interest of the government. Whereas Houghton
deemed the passenger's privacy expectations as "considerably dimin-
ished," it labeled the state's interests as "substantial.,, 323 Justice Scalia
premised this government interest in Houghton's purse on a need to
search Young's car. He asserted: "Effective law enforcement would
be appreciably impaired without the ability to search a passenger's
personal belongings when there is reason to believe contraband or
evidence of criminal wrongdoing is hidden in the car."324 This turns
the Fourth Amendment on its head. Instead of maintaining a particu-
larity requirement?25 where an officer may intrude only where he or
320 Id. (citations omitted).
321 South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364,368 (1976).
322 See Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1302.
323 See id.
324 id.
325 The Fourth Amendment provides that warrants be issued only when "particularly de-
scribing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONsT. amend.
IV. Again, the Court's declaration in Ross that an automobile exception search be neither
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she has justification to search, Houghton has expanded official search
powers once probable cause in a general place, such as a vehicle, is
established.
Houghton feared still more obstacles to effective law enforce-
ment. Due to a car's "ready mobility," evidence might be perma-
nently lost while police pursue a warrant.326 The driver and passenger
might be in cahoots, and therefore the driver "might be able to hide
contraband in a passenger's belongings as readily as in other contain-
ers in the car."327 In what seems to be a self-conscious moment, Jus-
tice Scalia realized that he might be substituting the worst possible
situation for the typical one. He wrote, "To be sure, these factors fa-
voring a search will not always be present, but the balancing of inter-
ests must be conducted with an eye to the generality of cases., 328 The
admission that the Court has focused its attention on the "generality
of cases" vividly shows the dangers of special needs balancing. The
Fourth Amendment, by its own terms, is meant to protect each indi-
vidual from every government search or seizure. This is evident by
the Amendment's reference to requirements designed to be applied in
the individual case, such as probable cause and particularity. The
more the Court performs its balancing analysis according to its own
notion of reasonableness, the farther it strays from protecting the citi-
zen in every case.
All of the talk about mobile vehicles and conspiracies between
occupants in cars seemingly multiplied the magnitude of the govern-
ment's interests. The problem with this reasoning was that there was
no governmental interest in the first place upon which to heap the pa-
rade of horribles. The government simply had no legitimate interest in
searching a purse in which its lacks probable cause.
Blanketly checking every purse in each automobile exception
search is reminiscent of an official action already prohibited by the
Court. In Delaware v. Prouse, 329 the Court was presented with an
officer's stop of a motorist in order to check the driver's license and
registration. Justice White, writing the opinion for the Prouse Court,
broader nor narrower than a search pursuant to a warrant causes this portion of the Amendment,
defining the limitations on the scope of a warrant search, to be relevant. See United States v.
Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820 (1982) (stating that the decision in Carroll v. United States "neither
broadened nor limited the scope of a lawful search based on probable cause").
326 See Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1302.
327 Id. at 1303. Curiously, the case cited by the Court to support this assertion, Rawlings v.
Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980), took place not between a driver and passenger, but between two
occupants of a house. See id. at 102. The connection of a discussion of passengers in a car with
a case involving only persons in a home itself demonstrates that the Houghton Court put forth a
contention that stretched too far.
328 Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1303.
"9 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
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noted that, "prior to stopping the vehicle [the officer] had observed
neither traffic or equipment violations nor any suspicious activity. 330
Prouse held that this suspicionless seizure violated Fourth Amend-
ment reasonableness. 331 This was in spite of an asserted government
interest in promoting roadway safety by "ensuring that only those
qualified to do so are permitted to operate motor vehicles.' 32 Prouse
doubted whether the "discretionary spot check" was "a sufficiently
productive mechanism to justify the intrusion upon Fourth Amend-
ment interests which such stops entail. ' 333 Regarding efficacy, the
Court noted that, "[T]he foremost method of enforcing traffic and
vehicle safety regulations ... is acting upon observed violations. 334
Moreover, Justice White worried about the impact such suspicionless
intrusions would have on innocent citizens. He noted: "It seems
common sense that the percentage of all drivers on the road who are
driving without a license is very small and that the number of licensed
drivers who will be stopped in order to find one unlicensed operator
will be large indeed. 335
In contrast to the common sense demonstrated by Justice White,
Justice Scalia in Houghton seemed seized by a bout of paranoia.
Without citing any factual support, he asserted that a car passenger
"will often be engaged in a common enterprise with the driver, and
have the same interest in concealing the fruits or the evidence of their
wrongdoing. '336 This haunting fear of conspiring motorists caused
Houghton to miss the bigger picture, which was painted by Prouse.
Admittedly, searching every purse in a car regardless of probable
cause will expose illegality which otherwise would have been missed.
This boost to law enforcement, however, comes at a terrible cost. As
the Prouse Court would have noted, the number of purses in which
suspicionless searches will find contraband would be "very small"
while the entire number of purses searched will be "large indeed."
Even more damning is the fact that the passenger's guilt-by-
association analysis has already been squarely rejected by the Court
itself. In United States v. Di Re,337 the Court was faced with a search
concerning a car passenger.338 On the homefront during World War
... Id. at 650.
331 See id. at 663 (requiring reasonable suspicion that a driver is unlicensed, a vehicle is
unregistered, or an occupant is otherwise subject to search and seizure to stop a vehicle and
detain its driver).
332 Id. at 658.
... Id. at 659.
334 id.
331 Id. at 660.
336 Wyoming v. Houghton, 119 S. Ct. 1297, 1302 (1999).
337 332 U.S. 581 (1948).
331 See id. at 583.
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H, an informant, Reed, tipped off an investigator for the Office of
Price Administration that "he was to buy counterfeit gasoline ration
coupons from a certain Buttitta. 339 Officers "trailed Buttitta's car and
finally came upon it parked at the appointed place.' 340 When they ap-
proached, officers found Reed in the back seat of Buttitta's car, hold-
ing what later proved to be two counterfeit gasoline coupons.341 Reed
explained that he had obtained the coupons from Buttitta, who was
sitting in the driver's seat.342 Reed said nothing to implicate Di Re,
the front seat passenger next to Buttitta.343 Yet, all three men were
placed in custody, frisked for weapons, and taken to the police sta-
tion. 4 When Di Re complied with an order to put the contents of his
pockets on a table, "[t]wo gasoline and several fuel oil ration coupons
were laid out., 345 Later, during Di Re's booking, a more thorough
search recovered one hundred coupons in an envelope "concealed
between his shirt and underwear.,
346
As a fallback argument,347 the government advanced the notion
that, incidental to an automobile exception search, it "may search any
occupant of such car when the contraband sought is of a character that
might be concealed on the person., 348 In Di Re, the government aimed
to bolster this contention with a rationale based on necessity.349 It of-
fered: "common sense demands that such right exist in a case such as
this where the contraband sought is a small article which could easily
be concealed on the person .,, 35 Notably, this language eerily fore-
shadows Justice Scalia's own worries in Houghton. As discussed
above, in Houghton, Justice Scalia saw the government needs as
"substantial," because he wrung his hands over the danger that car
passengers could be "concealing the fruits or the evidence of their
wrongdoing., 351 He further lamented, "[a] criminal might be able to
hide contraband in a passenger's belongings as readily as in other
containers in the car."352 However, unlike the members of the
Houghton majority, the justices of the Di Re Court did not perceive
.39 Id.
14 id.
" See id.
-42 See id.
3 See id.
34 See id
345 Id.
346 id.
347 The government advanced as its first contention the theory that the search of Di Re fell
within a search incident to arrest. See id. at 583-84.
'48 Id. at 584.
-19 See id. at 587.
"0 Id. at 586.
3-1 Wyoming v. Houghton, 119 S. Ct. 1297, 1302 (1999).
152 Id. at 1303.
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law enforcement as terribly vulnerable to perils stemming from
Fourth Amendment rights.
Justice Jackson, writing for the Di Re Court, deflated the gov-
ernment's "necessity" contention for searches of persons in cars by
drawing a comparison with searches of persons in houses. He noted
that the prosecution had refused to go out on the "necessity" limb
with homes: "The Government says it would not contend that, armed
with a search warrant for a residence only, it could search all persons
found in it. '353 Yet, Justice Jackson also noted that any dangers facing
the government in a car would likewise exist in the home:
[A]n occupant of a house could be used to conceal this con-
traband on his person quite as readily as can an occupant of a
car. Necessity, an argument advanced in support of this
search, would seem as strong a reason for searching guests of
a house for which a search warrant had issued as for search
of guests in a car for which none had been issued.354
He then applied the limits of a house search to a car search. In the
process, he also reaffirmed the Court's preference in searches sup-
ported by a warrant. Justice Jackson continued:
By a parity of reasoning with that on which the Government
disclaims the right to search occupants of a house, we sup-
pose the Government would not contend that if it had a valid
search warrant for the car only it could search the occupants
as an incident to its execution. How then could we say that
the right to search a car without a warrant confers greater
latitude to search occupants than a search by warrant would
permit?
55
The Di Re Court concluded, "[w]e are not convinced that a person, by
mere presence in a suspected car, loses immunities from search of his
person to which he would otherwise be entitled. 356
In demonstrating the fallacies in an argument supporting a search
of persons present during the execution of a warrant of a fixed struc-
ture, Di Re saw some three decades into the future, for this very issue
came to the Court in 1979. In Ybarra v. Illinois,357 State Bureau of
Investigation officers executed a search warrant authorizing the
3-3 United States v. DiRe, 332 U.S. 581,587 (1948).
354 Id.
355 Id.
356 Id.
357 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
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search of Aurora Tap Tavern and its bartender.358 Pursuant to a state
statute authorizing the search of "any person in the place at the time,"
officers frisked a bar patron, Ventura Ybarra, as he stood next to a
pinball machine.359 This search resulted in the recovery of heroin
from Ybarra's pants pocket.360 The Court concluded that this search
violated the Fourth Amendment.
361
Justice Stewart, writing for the Ybarra Court, refused to allow
law enforcement, in executing a search warrant for a particular loca-
tion, the automatic right to search every individual present at the lo-
cation.362 The government had simply failed to establish the requisite
need for such a search, for no probable cause existed to search
Ybarra, either at the time of issuing or at the time of executing the
warrant. True, Ybarra happened to be in the bar at the time it was
searched. "But," Justice Stewart noted, "a person's mere propinquity
to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, with-
out more, give rise to probable cause to search that person. ' 363
In Houghton, Justice Scalia dismissed Ybarra as involving the
distinct issue of search of the person rather than property.364 How-
ever, the fundamental logic of Ybarra applies equally to searches of
persons or places, for it states a basic requirement for probable cause
recognized in the automobile exception cases themselves. This is
shown in the following passage:
Where the standard is probable cause, a search or seizure of a
person must be supported by probable cause particularized
with respect to that person. This requirement cannot be un-
dercut or avoided by simply pointing to the fact that coinci-
dentally there exists probable cause to search or seize another
or to search the premises where the person may happen to
be.36
5
To say that Ybarra's understanding of probable cause is not novel
is to speak in understatement. As Justice Stewart's reference to par-
ticularity suggests, the idea that probable cause must be specified to a
particular person derives from the text of the Amendment itself. Quite
simply, the Warrant Clause includes a mandate for particularity: "no
"8 See id. at 87-88.
... See id. at 87 n.1, 89.
o See id.
3' See id. at 96.
362 See idat91.
363 Id.
364 Justice Scalia likewise distinguished Di Re. See Wyoming v. Houghton, 119 S. Ct.
1297, 1302 (1999).
-6 Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 91.
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Warrants shall issue, but... particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
3 66
To follow Justice Scalia's logic, the operation of the distinction
between searching the person in Ybarra and the search of a person's
purse in Houghton would create the following double standard: an
officer would need probable cause particularized as to a fanny pack
being worn by a person, yet would need no suspicion at all to search
the same fanny pack on the car seat next to a person.
Houghton's reasoning regarding passenger privacy suffered yet
another flaw. It committed the cardinal sin of assessing Fourth
Amendment rights by lumping individuals together. The Amendment,
however, provides "individualized protection," for each person is
"clothed with constitutional protection against an unreasonable search
or an unreasonable seizure. ' 367 The Court itself has previously re-
jected the kind of sloppiness shown in Houghton, ironically, in a case
involving none other than a passenger contesting a search which in-
cluded the recovery of evidence from a container found within the
passenger compartment of a vehicle.368 In Rakas v. Illinois, it was the
defendant who attempted to fit more than one individual under the
personal Fourth Amendment umbrella.369 When the expansion of the
Fourth Amendment over more than one person would have benefited
the defense, the Court in Rakas was adamant in its rejection of such
an application. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, declared:
"Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which, like some other
constitutional rights, may not be vicariously asserted., 370 However,
the Houghton Court, in allowing the invasion of a passenger's purse
merely because of suspicion pointing at the driver, failed to respect
Sandra Houghton's personal Fourth Amendment rights.
IV. CONCLUSION
In its pursuit of defining the automobile exception, the Court has
traveled down a long road; it has passed by nearly three-quarters of a
century since handing down Carroll. Throughout this lengthy line of
precedent, the Court has consistently considered all the facts when
366 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
367 Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 91.
36 See Rakas v. illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 130 (1978) (refusing to allow Fourth Amendments
rights to be vicariously asserted). In Rakas v. Illinois, during a vehicle search, police recovered a
box of rifle shells in a glove compartment and a sawed-off rifle under the front passenger seat.
See id.
369 See id. at 132-33 (addressing defendant's argument that he had standing to challenge
the search of a third person's property, which yielded evidence used against the defendant).
370 Id. at 133-34.
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determining probable cause to search. Now, however, the Court has
suddenly taken a wrong turn in Houghton v. Wyoming.
Further, this change in direction does not seem to be an accident.
In its selective treatment of the historical record and its unprecedented
application of special needs balancing to a traditional criminal inves-
tigation, the Court has strained its reasoning to gloss over the lack of
probable cause to support Officer Baldwin's search of Houghton's
personal effects. It seems as if the Court has intentionally avoided the
issue of probable cause as if it were a pothole in the Fourth Amend-
ment road. Probable cause, a fundamental threaded through all of the
automobile exception cases, and indeed, written in the text of the
Fourth Amendment itself, is now not so much a needed protection,
but an obstacle to maneuver clear of.
Without the common sense limit of probable cause, the scope of
the automobile exception becomes nonsensical. If an officer suspects
a driver of a crime, he or she may now search inside anyone else's
personal articles found in the car which are large enough to hold the
illegal contraband. All containers are vulnerable to government intru-
sion, regardless of facts pointing away from probable cause to search
a particular container.
If a male driver admits to drug use, the Court now enables an of-
ficer to search a seemingly innocent female passenger's purse. With
such a careless containment of scope, be forewarned: the government
now has reason to believe that stolen lawnmowers may lurk in your
upstairs bedroom.
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